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IN TR O D U C T IO N
The aim of this study is to examine the background 
and concepts of the international convention that ruling 
the conduct of liner conferences which has entered into 
force in October,1983. But, for many countries including 
mine, the Code is still an unfamiliar instrument. So, this 
study, first.intended to eliminate suspicions on what the 
Code really is and how we can make use of it,
Thailand has not ratified this convention, Threre are 
many different views regarding whether we should have rati­
fied it, Disputes are on what are the impacts to the nation­
al economy if the Code is aoplied and some doubts whether 
it can really work.
This study is devided into 3 parts. Part one deals 
with conference system. It consists of A chapters. Chapter 
I will explain how the situation developed that brought 
liners to meet and the first conference come to exist. Con­
ferences were found to be amixture of good and bad, A gues— 
tion has been raised: how should conferences be regulated? 
Chapter II says about brief history of public investigations 
and government controls over the system. Two different views 
of U.K, and U.S, Governments toward conferences are comoared. 
Conferences have an international characteristic. The dif­
ference in government attitudes toward the same body, con­
ferences, might arise disputes. A thought which suggests 
international accepted rules for conferences appeared. 
Chapterlll deals with the question how should conference
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be regulated. Some economic aspects of liner shipping that 
B.>5plain why competition solution are not workable in this 
industry. Some views on 'open' 'closed'conference and ra­
tionalization. Chapter lU is concerned with present organi­
sation and practices of conferences. Then part two headed 
"The UN Code of Conduct for Liner Conference" consists of 
2 chapters. Chapter V deals with developments that led to 
the existence of UN Code; chapter VI deals with some key
issues regarding its implementation. Part three: develop-=!
««
ment of national fleets with the Code consists of 3 chapters. 
Chapter VII the current situation of shipping industry in 
Thailand. Chapter VIII is about liner shipping and the par­
ticipation of Thai vessels in conferences. The last chapter, 
chapter IX is suggestion on the application of the- Code in 
Thai 1 and.
This subject is an exceptionally large one. It has 
taken a lot of my time to read and to understand before 
writing it. So, with this limit of time, this study has .„ 
missed many points which I first intended to include.







BACKGROUND TO CONFERENCE SYSTEM,
Shipping.conferences are among the earliest cartels 
in international tradel"*^hey are agreements organised by 
shipping lines operating on the same route/s or between the 
same range of ports. The basic objectives of a conference 
are to control competition between the members of the con­
ference and to eliminate outside competition on the route/s,
<«
The competition between the members of the conference is 
controlled by all the members agreeing to charge uniform 
rates. To effectively enforce the agreement on rates the 
members also agree to follow the same rules andreculations 
for calculating freight charges, oayment of freight, accep­
table packaging for different commodities, determine the 
standard percentage of brokerage commissions to be paid by 
members and the circumstances under which these may be paid. 
To further limit competition between the member lines, 
conference agreements may allocate definite ports of call 
to different members or restrict the .rrambers of sailings of 
each members. The competition for cargo between the member 
lines is further restricted in some cases by forming one or 
more pools between the member lines which provide for pool­
ing together cargo and/or freight revenue of all the members 
of the pool and then periodically sharing it according to 
agreed percentages.
To fight competition from non-conference lines,
6
conferences have evolved certain arrangements whereby they 
try to secure continued and exclusive patronage of the ■ > 
shippers to the conference lines. These are either in the 
form of positive inducements to shippers to confine their 
shipments exclusively to the members of the conference or 
a penalty to shippers who use a casual non-conference ship­
ping opportunity. These are called ” loyalty arrangements ” 
The nature of their organization varies considerably, 
depending on the market structure of the trade route^the 
jurisdictions of the countries whose trade they serve.
There is no typical conference. Some have been conferences 
quite literally-informal oral conferences-but many have 
employed written agreements establishing a permanent body 
with a chairman or secretary»and containing carefulLy des­
cribed rights-, and obligations of the conference membership. 
Penalties for violations of the agreement are sometimes 
stipulated and in such cases the posting of casti or a ful­
filment bond is usually required. There might be some : ~ 
arrangements to refer disputes to arbitration included in 
the agreement.
Shipping conferences have been in existence for some 
1i2S years now and today roughly 350 of them are operating 
throughout the world with individual membership ranging 
from two to as many as 40 separate lines.
The conference system has been found to be ^Inixture 
of bad and good. As soon as the first conference was founded, 
criticism. arisecJ, The basic arguments in favor of conferences
0
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are that they provide regular,reliable service with stable 
raates. The main arguments against them are abuse of monor* 
poly power with misallocation of resources,excess capacity 
with unnecessarily high freight rates, and,particularly, 
price discrimination. There have been many studies of the 
system,both by official agencies and academicians. Some 
findings are for the system,others against. These difference 
in concepts upon the system could be found for quite a long 
time in Governments'policy of different countries. Should
bonferencestie let free to restrict competition and 
enjoy: monopoly power ? Should Government^apply the concept
of counter-balance conference \l» shippers or shippers'council 
and let the industry be self regulated and make the best 
benefit from rationalization? Or,Should it be under close 
government's control ? But the nature of conferences is , 
international. If one country imposes control over them uni­
laterally^ It would likely arise conflict. This factor- 
supports the idea of having an international convention on
the control over liner conference conduct./th
In the mid of 19^century,several trends or develop­
ments joined and as a result there evolved shipping industry 
much as it is known and practiced today. One such trend or 
development was the rapid spread of the Industrial Revolution 
with its increasing need for foreign (overseas) markets and 
sources of raw materials. Another was the change from vessels 
propelled by wind and constructed of wood to vessels propelled 
by a screw or propeller powered by steam and constructed of
8<»
iron a t steel. Constructing vessels of iron and steel made 
possible larger vessels with larger cargo-carrying capacities. 
Prior to that time,most vessels had been owned or operated 
by traders or trading companies that owned the cargo being 
transported(with the cargo being transported from the manu­
facturing or industrialized countries to be sold at its des­
tination and with the cargoes to be brought back on such; 
vessels purchased at or near the places where the return 
voyage commenced). The ability to steam continuously at known
Mt
speeds,without regard to the wind,enabled operators, if 
desired, to set and follow more certain routes and schedules 
and arrival and departure times to and from various ports 
on the routes. With the larger vessels, operators oftentimes 
had space available to carry cargo other than that which 
they carried for themselves. With this additional space
and with more or less certedn schedules of sailing and routes, 
space could be offered to others who had cargo to be tran­
sported to or from the scheduled routes and ports, many 
products became transportable overseas for the first time 
and ’• shared " ocean transport provide-tJ new trading oppor­
tunities for a vast number of small and medium sized shippers.
As the market for steamship service rapidly grew, 
there developed a recognizable split in vessel services 
between tramp and liner shipping. Tramp shipping evolved 
rather quickly into a service involving full shipload lots 
and continued to be controlled by the relatively unrestricted 
play of market forces. In contrast, liner shipping focused
9
on the growing demand for the transport of general caxgo 
which tended to move in relatively small lots between a 
variety of destinations and among numerous shippers and con­
signees, Liner vessels were thus deployed over fixed geo­
graphic routes,attempting to maintain regular times of arrival 
and departure. Rather than relying on a completely free market 
determination of transportation rates,liner companies soon 
began publishing fixed rate sheets (or tariffs) which quoted 
prices that not only reflected the perceived demand for, and
Kthe cost of,the transportation service but also varied de­
pending on the value and stowing characteristics of each 
type of cargo.
The steamship revolution,with its faster and larger 
vessels,quickly generated over-capacity in the shipping 
market-place. A sailboat took an average of BO to B5 days 
to get from the I’.K, to Australia. This voyage u;e.5 shcrtenc-cJ 
by about 1F rJays bctmeen 1873 and 1897 with the use of steam­
ships, The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 also coincided 
with this period and led to a substantial reckiction of 
duration of the voyages from Europe to India and the Far 
East, The same amount of cargo that required,at the begin­
ning of the 19th century,four sailboats could be carried on 
one steamship for half the time by the end of the century.
The cargo movement did not keep pace with the fleets'ex­
pansion, Rate wars between competing liner companies led to 




The surviving liner firms,seeing the u/isdom of joint 
arrangements,begun to coordinate tonnage and sailings and to 
maintain rate levels, thereby lowering the risk of the busi­
ness, Controlling competition amongst themselves and creating 
a united front to fight, other carriers were the initial steps 
taken by the shipowners. As a result,the first liner confe­
rence,the U,K,-Calcutta Conference,was founded by seven
British liner companies in 1875 as the first succesful shipping
 ̂ (2)conference, „
The early years of conference evolution were marred 
by considerable resistance from major shipper who had grown 
accustomed to quantity rebates and flexible rates. Early 
conference rules attemped to apply a principle of equal treat­
ment of shippers by banning preferantial rates and rebates.
Big shippers looked for other alternatives. They turned to 
independent carriers who agreed to carry their cargo for 
lower rates. The conference,in order not to lose good,regular 
customers,agreed to give discount in exchange of loyalty from
the shippers to ship their cargo exclusively on conference
(3)vessels, Defered rebates concept was introduced, Thus,th& 
first loyalty agreement waS signed in 1877, Since then, con­
ference has grown very quickly both in number and pnwer.
As conferences, having cartel-like characteristic 
are able to play to a certain extent role in determination 
on freight level. Sometimes, they are believed or charged 
by shippers to play discrimination. Apart from rebates 
granted to shippers in exchange for the exclusive support.
other defences agaist the activities of non-conference 
lines include rate-cutting on specific parcels or certain 
commodities, and the berthing of additional vessels, 
namely fighting ships, to blanket the outsider sailings. 
Conferences have, over the years, fought Ijong and hard to 
protect their own spheres of interest, the intruder sometimes 
being a fellow member of an adjacent conference seeking to 
enlarge his field of operations, Many of these battles, 
especially those with the true speculative operator,, have 
ended with the outsider being driven from the trade, or 
perhaps with drawing when easier pickings seemed to be had 
elsewhere,
In the late 19D0's, there were quite a number of 
mergers and amalgamations of shipowners due to avoiding 
rate war.that facilitated the formation of tighter conferen­
ces in the early twentieth century. This concatination of 
events naturally aroused suspicions concerning the shipping 
industry, suspicions which gained support from allegations
of discrimination and other monopolistic practices made
(4)
from time to time by shippers.
There have been many official national inquiries into
the working of the system. The earliest was in 1909.(Royal
Commission on Shipping Rings) in the U,K, closely followed
by one in the USA in 1913 - 14 (Alexander Committee), The
most recent inquiry was in the U,K, where the Committee of
Inquiry into Shipping (Rochdale Committee) reported in 1970,




& 1 2 .
BACKGROUND OF THE REGULATION OF CONFERENCES
In 1906,the British Government started a thorough 
investigation of the subject and the United States Govern­
ment in 1912 began a comprehensive study of the situation 
in American commerce,The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings 
reported .to his Britannic Flajesty in 1909,and the Alexander 
Committee,which was charged by the Committee on Merchant
ic
Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives of the 
Congress of the United States to investigate all types of 
shipping combinations,issued their report in 1914,The consen­
sus of these reportswas that shipping conferences were neces­
sary to assure stability of rates,regularity of service, and 
improved facilities;but that these organizations contained 
the inherent vice of monopoly power,
As the name indicates,Conferenes are organized groups 
made up- of independent and competing shipping lines. Conferences 
are not registered companies and have no private legal status. 
The vast majority of shipping conferences are international 
in scope with member companies operating under different 
national flags. Most conferences limit their activities to a 
pair of particular geographical regions, known as a "trade", 
which usually covers the trade between two or more countries. 
Some operate in one direction only but a few are round-voyage 
conferences. Shipping companies may belong to one or several 
conferences and, although liner companies tend to be either
a
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conference-prone or independent,there are a number of liner
firms that operate as conference members in certain trades
as independents,0 r outside the conference, in othersf"̂ ^
The first to conduct a public inquiry into the conference
system were the British, In 1906, the Royal Commission on
Shipping Rings was appointed. In 1909, after three years of
thorough investigations, the commission came out with its
report.The Commission concluded,in its majority decision,
that the conference system,as a whole,does not operate to the
««
detriment of the British economy, A system of checks and balances 
is inherent in the conference itself,ie.,the internal com­
petition among the member lines. Outside competition from 
independent carriers and the common actions taken by shippers 
secure the phenomenon from abusing its powers in an unreason­
able manner. The majority did not consider legislation as a 
solution to control the powers of the conferences .The Commission 
recommended the. formation of shippers^ organizations for the 
purpose of negotiating with conferences as collective represen­
tatives of the users of conferences services. The majority 
further recommend that the Board of Trade should keep conference 
practices under review by demanding the filing of conference 
agreements with it and the publication of their tariffs. The 
minority group demanded more stern action by the authorities 
to avoid monopoly abuses. The Commission^ majority report 
recognized the advantages of the conference system,!.e, the 
stability of rates and the regularity of service. The majority 
concluded that the advantages of the conferences are substan-
0
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tially dependent on the tying arrangments, the deferred rebates, 
or some other system which is equally as effective. The only 
method the majbrity saw as necessary to secure the fairness 
of these arrangements was the depositing of the agreements 
with the Board of Trade. Even the minority did not recommend 
any legislation which might prohibit or restrict tying devices. 
The minority concluded that the conference systemdoes not 
necessary supply regular and adequate service, and the stable 
rate is not such a big advantage because it is usually higher
«c
than the competitive.rates. However,the minority opinion did 
not suggest the abolishing of the conference system. The recom­
mendations of the Royal Commission were not implemented in 
England,probably because of the strong position the shipowners 
held in that maritime nation.
In the U.S, in 1912, a feu years after UK investigation 
a Congressional Committee the Hause of Representatives Mer­
chant Marine and Fisheries Committee,under the chairmanship 
of Representative Joshua Alexander,undertook the task of 
inquiring into the modes and prectices of shipping conferences.
The Alexander Committee (named after its chairman) faced a
(9)double problem.
First,the U.S, was not a maritime power;and second, 
the existence of the antitrust laws,which state that every 
contract,combination in the form of trust or otherwise,or 
CQj^spiracyin restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
states,or with foreign nations,is declared to be illegal.
The Committee reviewed the advantages and disadvantages
of conference system,concluding that the system should be 
maintained,but under closer government regulation.
The Committee did not favour the prohibition of con­
ferences because it felt that such an action would involve 
a 'whole sale disturbance'of the conditions that existed 
in the shipping industry.lt was also concluded that pro­
hibition would deprive shippers of the advantages cited were;̂
- greater regularity and frequency of service,
- stability and uniformity of rates,
««
- economy in the cost of service,
- better distribution of sailings,
- maintenance of US and European rates to foreign markets 
on a parity,and
- equal treatment of shippers through the elimination 
of secret arrangements and underhanded methods of 
discrimination.
The disadvantages cited by the Committee included:-
- the elimination of competition through the use of 
fighting ships and unlimited rate cutting,
- Bxcessiv/e and arbitrary rates,
- complete conference -domination of shippers,
- conference indifference to the landing of freight in 
proper condition,
- secrecy of agreements and conferences,
- discriminatory rates between large and small shippers,
- the state of continual dependence that shippers were 
placed in as a result of the deferred rebate.
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The committee felt that termination of conference
arrangements would result in either rate wars or consolidation
through common ownership. Neither alternative was seen as * 
prefsEcahle to the conference system.
In light of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
conference system,the Committee suggested that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission shall have jurisdiction over the activities 
of the shipping conferences operating in the foreign commerce 
of the U,S, The conference should file their agreements with 
ICC that will have the authority to cancel,modify,or approve 
those agreements. The criterion of disapproval should be 
based upon whether or not the agreements are detrimental to 
U,5,commerce. The Alexander Committee also recommended that 
tariffs should be published; that deferred rebates and fighting 
ship should be outlawed; that the ICC should have..the authority 
to investigate,on its own initiative,matters concerning these 
subjects;and that if needed, the ICC could order the dis­
banding of a conference,^
By not being allowed to cooperate, the shipping compa­
nies will engage in constant rate wars. As mergers are restricted 
in the U,S,,shipping companies will rise and fall by the dozen,
Li. S, economy,in general,and the American shipowners and ship­
pers, inparticular, will be hurt. Therefore,the Committee 
recommended to let the conferences operate and to exempt them 
from the antitrust laws. As a result of the Committee s 
recommendations,in September of 1916,the Shipping Act was 
passed in the U,S,Congress, The Shipping Act encompasses the
1 7 .
major recommendations of the Alexander Report and remains
today,as amended, the guiding legislations for ocean freight
regulation. The Act provided for acceptance ofthe conference
system with government supervision, but rather than investing 
the regulatory power in the ICC, Congress created the U.S.
Shipping Board, a predecessor of the Federal Maritime Com—  
(14)mission.' '
The U.K.and all other major European maritime nations 
have a commonview,adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward 
liner conference operations. While,in U.S, it was believed 
that even though conference were necessary but subject to 
certain government.controls. These different attitudes would 
cause difficulties because the liner shipping including con­
ference has a characteristic of an international activ-ity
over which one nation imposes control would be considered as
(!̂)unilateral actions. Conflicts would be likely tO-OGcur,
IMevertheless,for over 40 years following enactment of the 
Shipping Act, there was no relatively restrained conference 
control over liner trades. Despite U.S, maritime law and 
regulatory tradition,conferences expanded their control over 
services and rates. Outside the U.S, they acted independently 
of government regulation. Even in the U.S.trades the system 
of deferred rebates flourished,despite its illegality.
In 1958 the U.S, Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the Isbrandtsen case. After over a decade of questioning 
the legality of dual-rate contracts used by conferences,the 




of the Shipping Act when employed as  ” 
are charged a lower freight rate than non-signatories. This 
system of immediate rebates had been used in placê ' of the 
deferred rebate,which was outlawed in the U.S,trades by the 
Shipping Act,̂ ^̂ ^
As a result of the Isbrandsen decision,there was 
concern,- that the effective operation of the conference 
system would be hampered. Consequently,Congress enacted 
legislation suspending the effect of the Isbrandsen decision 
for two years, during-which time the dual-rate system would 
be carefully scrutinized so that an " ultimate solution to 
the problem could be finally and fully resolved ” , 
Congressional concern resulted in two years of hearings on 
the ocean freight industry
Immeadiately following the Isbrandtsen case,the House 
merchat f'larine and Fisheries Committee, under the chairmanship
I
of■Herbert C.Boner,conducted an extensive study of steamship 
conferences and dual-rate contracts. Also in 1959,the "Anti­
trust " Subcommittee of the Hbuse Judiciary Committee chaired 
by Emanuel Cellar, began an investigation of monopoly problems 
in the ocean freight industry. The Bonner Committee made
extensive use of the Celler Subcommittee's findings in deve-
(18)loping its recommendations.
The findings of the Bonner Committee resulted in the
1961 enactment of Public Law 87-3AB which authorized the use 
of dual-rate contracts,while providing additional safeguards 
to shippers. This was the first major piece of legislation
«»
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amending the regulatory provisions of the Shipping Act since
1916,The Committee had ascertained that the traditional
principles of anti-trust could not be applied to the ocean
freight industry.lt decided that it should encourage
the continued maintenance of effective conferences and that,
within safeguards,it should authorize and direct the FMC
to approve.exclusive patronage arrangements without which
conferences might well become ineffective,The Committee had
clearly intended that a strong conference system be ensured
fl9)through the dual-rate contract,' '
Following enactment of Public Law 87-346, the Celler 
Report was published in 1962,This report reflected the sub­
committee's view that the national shipping policy as embo­
died in the Shipping Act of 1916 was fundamentally sound; 
however,the enforcement of the statutes regulating the indus­
try had been deficient,The Subcommittee found the conference 
system had changed very little since the Alexander Report. 
There continued to be flagrant abuses of the conference's 
privileges,while its strengths increased,Among the abuses 
found..by_the. Celler Subcommittee were
- secret rate agreement,
- unapproved divisions of traffic and territories,
- secret rebates,
- conference admission restrictions,and
- discriminatory treatment of shippers.
The Subcommittee noted with respect to conferences,that 
where anti-trust immunity has been so widely abused it would
9 20
have been consistent with Congressional policy to with­
draw it,However,the Subcommittee cited three basic reasons 
for not recommending withdrawal of anti-trust immunity:-
- existing institutional structures of long and histo­
rical standing should not be set aside except as a last 
resort".
- the conference system is an international one that 
could not be eliminated and might not be improved merely 
by withdrawel of lines, foreign as well as American-jopera- 
ting in the foreign commerce of the United States",
- outright elimination of the conference system in 
U,S, foreign commerce without enactment of substantial 
safeguards and authorization of much increased subsidies 
might well result.in inflicting severe hardship upon our 
American merchant marine and in creating substantial
rate instability presently undesired by American shippers".
The Seller Subcommittee made it abundantly clear that 
it did not endorse the manner in which conferences had been 
conducting their ooerations,The Subcommittee indicated that 
it was necessary'to revise methods for controlling the opera­
tions of conferences and for prohibiting abuses which violate 
conference agreements,to deter violations of the law,to safe­
guard shippers from unreasonably high conference rates, to pro­
tect nations and ports from unjustified discrimination,and
to leave the way free for independents to enter the trades'. 
The legislative revisions to the Commission's respon­
sibilities that were enacted into law in 1961 included the
( 2 0 )
addition of section 18(b) which required all carriers in 
the foreign trade to file with the Commission their tariff 
rates,classification,rules and regulations and any changes 
thereto.This legislative change initiated the tariff filing 
requirement that is currently the subject of much debate.
It is interesting to note that the Congressional and Execu­
tive decisions to require that the Commission ensure that , 
the carrier's tariffs contain a certain amount of integrity 
was based on years of investigations which revealeda litany
orof abuses and discriminatory behaviour.
The increased attention given to shipping regulation 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in an increase in 
the Commission's responsibilities,apparently because Congress 
had decided that the regulation of liner shipping had not 
been rigorous enough to prevent abuses of power,During this 
same time period,a series of decisions by the courts reduced 
the scope of anti-trust immunity that the shipping companies 
had thought they ■ possessed.
These court decisions have become part of the shipping 
industry lexicon and the mere mention of Svenska,Carnation 
and Sabre can send chills up the spine of shipping executives. 
As a result of the Svenska decision,the Commission decided 
that activities which represented serious anti-trust intru­
sions required a more substantial anti-trust-type justifi­
cation before they could be approved,The net result of the 
Carnation and Sabre decisions was that carriers are no 
longer certain as to whether agreements are vested with total
® 21 .
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anti-trust immunity.To a large degree the stricter condi­
tions placed upon conference behaviour reflect the Judiciary
Committee's view that conferences should be tolerated but
(21)not encouraged.
This development of US legislation gave rise to serious
problems of jurisdiction as one country unilaterally attempted
to impose its own theories and laws to this international
caracteristic liner industry,As the Rochdale Committee in
U,K, dicussed this problem in its report that "the FPOC duties
have brought it into direct dispute with the government of
other countries;they have strongly disputed its alleged
powers of jurisdiction in requiring alteration..'of contracts
concluded outside the U,S,A,;perhaps not even with US entities,
and the provision of documentary evidence,particularly of a
financial nature,They have also objected to the way in
which unilateral US decisions could effect their national
economic interests,even where no jurisdictional issue were 
(■22)involved.
In 1964,the UK Government took powers enabling it to 
forbid UK companies to meet certain of the demands of the 
me.The sanctions operating for the m C  are fines under 
the Shipping Acts and,perhaps of greater consequence,triple 
damages under the anti-trust Act,"
The report further mentioned that "detailed regulations 
imposed by the Commission are said to have directly damaged 
UK interests by making heavy demands on management's time 




It has also been claimed the requirement that 
conferences should be'open' has led to very substantial 
over-tonnaging of the North Atlantic routes with the USA, 
As a result of the present system,cargo liners on these 
routes have been sailing,on average over a period of 
years,nearly two-thirds empty and are currently said to 




THE ECONOIVIIC STRUCTURE OF THE LINER INDUSTRY WHICH LEADS ■
TO DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION-,
General structural conditions required for perfect 
comoEtition to be workable. Those economic attributes which 
mpst be present to ensure comformance with the microeconomic 
textbook model of pure competition are :
*€- There must be ease of entry and exit from the industry. 
Firms must be able to respond to market forces (profits) 
in their decisions to enter or exit an industry,
- The serv/ice offered by vessel operators must be simi­
lar or homogeneous,
- There must be a large number of firms in each market.
The greater the number of firms, the less impact any 
one carrier can have on market price.
The most valid economic reason for concluding that 
competitionr is not workable in the liner industry is that 
condition number one -free entry and exit- is not fulfilled. 
Ocean shipping today is an exceedingly capital intensive 
industry. Even though, liner operations are, on the average, 
significantly more expensive than other forms of oceaEn 
transport. The reasons are obvious. Liner vessels are more 
costly to build and operate than, most other cargo ships.
Liner operations reĉ uire an expensive infrasturcture of 
terminals, reservation and communication, systems, networks 
of cargo agents, etc. Ships built to serve as liners are
2 5 .
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normally designed to be fit in the intended trades accor­
ding not only to the nature of the commodities transpnrted 
(whether they can be containerized or not) but also to port 
infrastructure and the capabilities of the inland transport 
systems in the countries served. Entering liner shipping 
means a long term investment. All these conditions make a 
move of a liner from one trade to another difficult.
Some other factors regarding the economic structure 
of the liner industry itself not allowed competitive*solu­
tion to be workable,:The cost structure of the liner indus­
try is one of the key factors in understanding why unfettered 
competition is unworkable.
The ocean liner industry does notqiaalify as a natural 
monopoly -such as public utility- because economies of scale 
are not great enough to lead to a monopoly solution. Internal 
long run costs do not demonstrate a tendency to decline such 
that one firm could supply the entire market before all 
economies of scale are exhausted.
High Ratio of Fixed and Constant Costs,
While the capital intensity is not High enough to 
lead to the natural monopoly solution in the liner indus­
try, capital costs and, therefore, fixed costs are becoming 
a larger proportion of total costs. In addition, most other 
costs are constant in the short run produces that a short 
run average cost declines rapidly as output (capacity 
utilization) is expanded.
The reason that liner operators have such a large
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proportion of their costs which are constant is because of 
the nature of the common carrier service these o-perators 
offer. Liner operators offer a schedule of services and rates 
which are fixed in the short run. Liner operators, therefore, 
are susceptible to the risks inherent in a fluctuating market 
for their services.
Table
Relationship between load factor and average 
cost per container .
Load Factor 25 50 70 85 100
Average Cost Per Container $2228 $12A0 S958 $843 $747
Source : "Market Environment and Container System Producti­
vity," National Maritime Research Center, Kings 
Point, New York, 1974,
Having a larĉ e portion of costs being constant, ave­
rage and marginal cost per unit of output decline rapidly 
results in ;
- forcing carriers to place a high premium on full uti­
lization since few costs are soared if a vessel is 
50^ rather than 100^ full,
- A carrier that realized a load factor of 50^ would 
have to charge a shipper |1240 per container ( see 
table) to break even, i,e,, cover expenses. If this 
same carrier could achieve a load factor of 100^, a 
charge of $747 per container would be sufficient,
- Liner operators incline to use marginal cost pricing, 
if necessary, to obtain cargo.
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Since variable or marginal costs account for only 
around 20 percent of total costs, marginal - cost pricing must 
be destructive.
Elasticity of Demand
It is commonly agreed that the demand for ocean tran­
sportation is inelastic. Thus, a reduction in rates of 10 per 
cent, for example, will lead to a less than 10 percent increase 
in quantity shipped, and total revenue will decline rather 
than increase. The demand for liner transportation services 
is a derived demand. Therefore, to calculate the price elas­
ticity of demand, for transportation, one must multiply the 
ratio of the freight rate to the value of the commodity by 
the elasticities of demand and supply for the commodity.
The conclusion that demand for transportation is in­
elastic should not be confused with the notion of cross elas­
ticity, That is, if one carrier reduced its rates below the 
rest, and offered a similar service, that individual carrier 
would experience a surge in demand and his demand schedule 
would appear highly elastic. The rest of the group which was 
experiencing a loss in its marketshare, would have no choice 
and in the classic oligopolistic reaction, they would match 
the reduption possibly precipitating a rate war.
ffll above factors and the circumstance that rapid 
exit from the industry is not possible ultimately results in 
a breakdown of competitive solution,
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Houj should liner shipping be regulated 7
Let refer back to the Rochdale's report. The report 
concludes that " the 'open 'conference appears least likely 
to serve the interests of shippers. It is also least likely 
to serve that of shipowner "...'closed 'conferences without 
rationalised sailing schedules may have attractions for ship­
owners and may, in some cases, provide a better service for 
shippers than would be available in the absence of restric­
tions," and " The ' closed'conference with fully rati'onalised 
sailings appears to us most likely to serve the best interests 
of both shippers and shipowners,"
UNCTAD also suggested that a government that seeks to 
reduce the level of freight rates has basically two options.
It can either encourage competition by non-conference liner 
operators in the expectation that they will undercut confe­
rence rates, or it can press shipowners and shippers to ra­
tionalize and so aim to reduce rates by reducing the overall 
cost of service. The principles underlying•these alternatives 
are fundamentally different: increased competition by non- 
conference liner services will make the overall liner trade 
less rational and may make it more costly (by increasing 
over-tonnaging,duplication of sailings,and fragmentation of 
the overall cargo movement),while rationalization will inevi­
tably involve increased restrictions on competition,since it 
cannot be implemented satisfactorily unless shippers adhere 
to their conference loyalty agreements.
i|t an UNCTADs report 'Consultation W.achinery,Protection of 
shipper interests; Ah action programme ,21 January 1975,
o
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UNCTAD further comments that the introductions of a 
rationalization scheme can Ike expected to lead to a direct 
reduction in the costs of a liner service,'"
The same document points out that conferences in general 
are incapable of rationalizing their services because they are 
unable to match their fleet size to the available cargo volume. 
And it does suggest that rationalization, implying closed 
conferences and strong loyalty agreements, combined with an 
efficient organization of shippers, meaning an effective use 
of the shippers^ combined bargaining strength, under certain 
conditions ” may be much more effective than the traditional 
form of competition, "
We can see later that the principle of having 'closed 
conference 'with full rationalization is fully applied in the 
Code,
In U,S, there have been many academicians and govern­
ment officers supporting this principle. This reflected in 
the current regulatory thinking in the USA, Current thinking 
on how liner shipping should be regulated is best understood 
by examining the contents of a recently proposed bill in the 
U,S,Congress, Although it may be subjected to further modi­
fication, the embodiment of current congressional thinking 
is found in HR 1878 - the Shipping Act of 1983, It also 





CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICES
As mentioned before, Shipping Conferences axe not legal 
entities. The members are not partners of any kind, they do 
not integrate their serv/ices, they do not merge together. The 
relationship among the members is contractual either in a 
written or an oral gentlemen form of agreement.
««
Conference headquarters and secretariat
The chairman of the conference, in some cases, is an 
independent figure not affiliated with the members. Sometimes, 
the chairmanship rotates among the members. The main function 
of the chairman is to direct and coordinate the conference's 
rate-making. Very rarely is the coordinator given decision­
making power regarding conference policies. His opinions can 
be influential, but the decisions are made by the vote of all 
the conference members. The basis of voting is usually one 
member one vote.
The decision-making procedures vary from conference to 
conference and from subject to subject. In most of the confe­
rences admission of new members is only decided by unanimous 
vote. In cases of rate changes, some conferences are satisfied 
with a simple majority vote; whereas others require a two- 
thirds or a three-quarters majority vote.
Some conferences establish committees to whom they 
delegate powers in specific areas with decision-making authority.
Decisions regarding conference activities and policies,many 
times, require a unanimous vote. This might impair the ade­
quacy of conferences tend to authorize selected committees, 
from their members, with decision-making powers to handle 
routine matters, and to leave to the full quorum only policy 
matters. Sometimes the conference's chairman will be delegated 
power enabling him to reach a quick solution. Other committee 
may be established todo some works.: such as observe the cargoes' 
movements trend on the route and react accordingly ±>y 
adjusting the rates and contracting with the shippers.
The conferences'general assemblies meet, normally, on 
prescheduled dates such as once a month or at bimonthly con­
ventions, If there are urgent cases ad hoc meetings might be 
held,
A non-active member, i,e,, one who declines to full- 
fill his sailing requirements, might lose his vote and even­
tually his membership in the conference. A conference will 
dissolve if the members cannot reach an agreement on major 
issues like shares of trade, sailing schedules, and freight 
rates.
Normally, conferences'members are equal under the 
contracts. However, there are some cases in which the members 
are not equal, where some members have fewer rights than 
others. These 'second class 'participants are the associate 
members. Their sailing righ-ts are limited and they are not 
allowed to vote in conference meetings.





carrier. In other trades there is no such obligation, but 
nevertheless a general expectation that having advertised 
a sailing and calls at particular ports a liner will accept 
all cargo offering on that route on a "first come - first 
served” basis, whether the cargo is attractive or not to 
the shipowner, easy or difficult to handle, provided suita­
ble space is available and the terms are mutually satisfactory, 
except for certain goods which may affect the safety of ship 
or cause damage to other cargoes,'
Some characteristics of conference agreements.
The conference agreement is a compromise between the 
shipping companies operating on a given route. There are no 
rules as to what is the ideal agreement for the regulation 
of different route conditions. In many conferences, there is 
not a single agreement but a set of mutually inter-related 
agreements between the member lines.
The duration of the agreement is usually not specified 
in the contract. The very first conference that was established 
in 1875 still exists,
A conference agreement may cover all or some of the 
following matters ;
a, the sphere of the conference, i.e, the range of ports which 
come within the purview of the agreement;
b, types of membership, e.g. full (or regular) members and 
associate members, their rights and obligations, terms and 
conditions of membership, viz, admission fee, security de­
posit, faithful performance bond;
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c, rules regarding admission, withdraiual, suspension and 
expulsion of a member;
d, rules regarding conference meetings, voting procedure;
e, Conference secretariat,the officers and their duties;
f, obligation of the member lines in rate matters and in 
the operation of conference services;
g, practices of member lines which are prohibited under the 
conference agreement;
h, self-policing provisions -investigation of and pe^nalties 
against malpractices of the member lines;
i, appointment of committees;
j, arbitration of disputes between members, and
k, participation in other agreements.
Pooling agreements.
Pools are a natural conference adjunct in as much as 
they! serve primarily to limit service competition while the 
uniform rate limits price competition.
Pooling can take various forms ranging from agreements 
to control the number of sailings of each pool member to a 
system in which the actual cargo carried as revenue earned by 
each member line is controlled. In addition to the allocation 
of sailings, the conference lines may also pool cargo and/or 
revenue, A cargo pool usually relates to a specific commodity 
or group of commodities and under the pool each member is en-? 
titled to carry a specified percentage share of the freight 
tons of the item/s concerned carried by all members of the 
pool. Sometimes, only cargo pools are not enough to limit
internal competition,A wide variety of cargoes move in
most conference trades,with a wide disparity in the freight
rates on the various commodities,with the result that the
members may compete with each other for high-rate cargoes.
The formation of a revenue pool eliminates competition
for the more profitable cargoes and,at the same time,ensures
that the less attractive cargoes also handled.
In a revenue pool the total freight revenue of all 
the participants in the pool is shared according to aereed 
percentages,Usually the revenue paid into the pool is 
either a fixed percentage of total revenue,or total revenue 
minus a fixed amount per ton carried,The revenue shares of 
different pool members are normally matched by correspon­
ding obligations to carry more or less the same percentage 
of cargo as their share of the pool,In practice,therefore, 
in a majority of cases the pooling agreements cover both 
cargo and revenue,
A number of pools are designed primarily for ratio­
nalization purposes-,. T h e y  are regarded by the con­
ferences as ’’self-imposed restrictions" agreed between mem­
ber lines to provide the proper number of sailings to handle 
the expected cargo movement,Restrictions on sailings are 
accepted voluntarily by conference members in order to avoid 
overtonnaging and duplication of sailings,
(27)Pooling agreements include provisions regarding;-' ' 
1, coverage;
- carriers




- separate pools by commodity group.
2, operational requirements:




k , cotribution rates (revenue pools) may or may not include:
- bunker,currency adjustments
- taxes
- ad valorem charges
- container rental
- port differentials
- deductions/additions for non pier-to-pier con­
tainer rates or free-in,free-out,free-in-and- 
out rates.
5, penalities:
- forfeiture for under carriage,
6, pool transfers:
- frequency of settling accounts.
Pools covering a particular trade route can be either 
"blanket" regional pools (i.e, covering all points ujithin 
a coastal renge) or port-specific pools,Pools generally 
apply to the trade betu/een specified ports only,Some con­
ference ports may cover non-pool ports.Different pools 
may exist for different sections of the trade covered by the 
conference,Some conference members operating in a particular
9
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section may operate outside the pool covering that section.
This situation usually arises where a carrier has access
to cargoes that others do not ( through cargo preference
(28 )of a country to its national lines for example).
Pooling arrangements do not necessarily cover the 
whole trade,Certain commodities are,however,still consi­
dered unsuitable as to include in the pool,For example, 
hazardous cargo would be exempted as would be bulk cargo 
such as wheat,metal ores and sugar,and those special 
stowage/handling cargoes.
Some pools require that members meet extraordinary 
cargo movement requests ,Associate membership in a pool 
is sometimes granted whereby the associate member receives 
more than some small fraction (say 2 , 5 %  ) of total gross 
pool revenues,then the excess (less carring allowances) is 
due to the pool account,Pool shares can be fixed for a spe­
cified period and subject to regualr negotiation or can 
be changed only upon petition of an unsatisfied) pool 
member.
Sailings can;be allocated in the 
rights,Some pools also stipulate an even 
over the period,If a member carries less 
amount he will not be compensated unless 
force majeure prevented him from filling
form of berthing 
spread of sailins 
than the minimaflj 
he can prove that 
his quota,Thus ,
allocation can take place based on the share of sailings 
made,capacity provided,tonnage carried,revenues earned,or 
some combination of these,The most typical arrangement is a
o
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ccmbined cargo/revenue pool,which allocates revenue but 
provides adjustments to encourage a similar split of 
tonnage carried,
U1timately,the members of a pool are interested 
in their net revenues,or earnings,from providing liner 
services.lt is in trying to approximate this division that 
the terms of pooling agreements become too complex.The 
costs of carriage of various commodities differ.
Revenue from various commodities vary accordiog to 
the tariffsched ule. Serving different ports changes carrier; 
costs,The pool must also take care to avoid arrangements 
which might provide incentives to member to use the lines 
autside the pool,
f31)Administration of pools
The administration of the pool itself is usually
conducted through a pool committee of the member or their
agents,This body typically keeps track of cargo movement 
and vessel scheduling,and monitors members^performance.
The conference secretary is some-times - the pool secretary.
When many ports are covered by a pooling agreement,there
will often be several pool committees.
Fixing the pool shares is a critical part of the
administration of the pool,Where two or more lines of the
same flag are members of a pool,the shares are first fixed
on the basis of flag groups,then between members within
each flag group,shares may be allocated among others,on the
basis of:-
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- negotiations between pool members,
- commercial and other requirements of the trade,
- past performance of each member,
- future potential of each member,
- capacity of a line to compete as an outsider if 
agreement cannot be reached,and
“ national aspirations of different members.
Conference freight rate and tariff
* •Every member of a conference has to charge his 
services according to uniform rates as in the tariff,This 
is supplemented by rules covering matters such as calculation 
and correction of freight charges,In working out the freight 
charges on any commodity-..between the ports served by the 
conference the tariff refer to by the members of the confe­
rence and their agents.
There is no set pattern for a conference tariff,but, 
they usually cover some of the following;-
1, rules and regulations cpveting matters such as calculation 
of freight charges,payment of freight;
2, commodity rates or class rates section;
3, additional charges for ports other than basis ports 
which are covered direct;
4, additional charges for ports covered with transhipment;and
5, index of commodities.
Until recently the tariffs were regarded as confiden­
tial by most of the conferences operating outside the jurisdic­
tion of the’LbSjBhipping Act,Shippers had no idea of the gene-
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ral structure of rates in the tariff.
Conference rates are basically of two types: class 
rates and commodity rates.The cargo is listed in tariffs 
according to either class group or individual products 
accordingly.There are tariffs according with as few as 
five classes while others have upto fifty or more classes. 
Rates are per class,Commodity rates catalogues the commo­
dities in detail,quoting freight rates for each, commodity, 
These tariffs can have up to as many a® seven or eight 
thousand items depending on the quality of products carried 
on the conference's vessels,Both kinds of tariffs have a 
NOS (not otherwise specified ) rate for cargo not quoted 
in them,This NOS rate applies to a wide variety of goods 
that cannot be classified under a specific describtion or 
class in the tariff.The NOS rate will usually be relatively 
high when there are demands from shippers for fixing 
specific rates for those new cargoes. Conferences would 
consider their regularity and significant quantities of 
those cargoes to be shipped,The conference prescribes that 
the rates are calculated according to weight or measurement 
of commodity,whichever produces the greater revenue,.Sotne 
tariffs include ad valoreum charges for certain products. 
Usually the tariff contains provisions dealing with packing 
conditions and other characteristics of special cargo 
features such as special weights,exeptione I lengths,and 
unusual susceptibility to various conditions,Additional 
fees are then charged accordingly.
AO.
The conference generally lay down a certain minimum 
freight charge per bill of lading,whatever the item carried 
and however small the consignment.
Normally, all commodities described in the tariff 
are accompanied by fixed freight to be' charged for their 
carriage.However,at times there are some commodities with 
open rates where the tariff does not quote a price for 
their transportation,In cases like this,the conference members 
are free to set their own rates.Open rates are usual]^ declared 
in times of competition with outsiders for the transportation 
of a specific product only.The open rates will usually be 
attached to bulk cargo that unusually moves on conference 
vessels.
Increase in freight rates
Host of the freight rate increases are general,across 
the board,increases,The shipowners are unable to price the 
carriage of an individual product according to exact costs.
For this reason,changes in costs have to be spread over 
all the commodities carried and the increase is therefore 
general,The reason for rate increases may be because of 
increases in costs of operation.There is no • strict rule as 
to what is the level of cost increase that justifies a rate 
increase.
The general rate increase has not equivalent impact 
on different commodities since the rise in freight is not 
related to the price of the specific product,Some shippers 
can absorb the increase while others offset it the same way
0
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as shipouiners do,by imposing it on the consumer or,by
endevouring to increase productivity or by obtaining 
government subsidies.Those shippers,who ship low value 
cargoes,are badly hurt by any rate increases,The addi­
tion to the products^prices harms their competitiveness.
Most of exemption resulted from bargsi^g power 
of shippers and government interventions and the conference 
consideration of the result of the increase of the rate 
that might reduce volume of cargoes to be shipped ,
Only the US has a statutory requirement to pub­
lish thirty days in advance an intention to increase 
freight rates.Decreases in rates may become effective upon 
their publication and filing with the commission.
The introduction of containers in the mid -19B0s
and the increasing popularity of their usage might pave
the way for a new system of rate charging,A1though cargo
is carried in these big boxes.prices of transportation
are still based on the old tariffs,Sticking to the old 
system is justified from the point of view that containers
only ease the cargo handling process while the cost con­
struction of the ship's operation,in principle,does not 
change.
After containerization has been introduced,there 
was an idea of applying a single rate to every container 
calculated to weight only,It could bring about far-rea­
ching changes in world trade,If this single rate was 
applied in a worldwide scale^Final prices of the vast
a
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majority of goods moving ujill ba changedj eithar upu/ards 
or downwards,Ratas will hika on low valwe goods moving 
in big quantitias,Cheap goods and semi-manufacturad pro­
ducts that ara now transportad for low ratas,becausa of 
tha change,might be driven out of the international market.
Averaging freight rates
The averaging of freight rates is made in various 
forms.Since the ship carries an assortment of products and 
the cost of carriage has to be spread among them,the tate 
for each commodity incorporates a form of averaging,Dividing 
a tariff into very few classes of cargo perpetuates the 
averaging because products of a variety of size and weight 
will be charged a similar rate,The more detailed the tariff 
is,the less averaging is done;though,still,the rate is not 
fixed individually for each item on the basis of its trans­
portation characteristics.
Carrying the additional tons above the amount that 
secures earnings plus costs'coverage is actually cheaper; 
yet,the extra tons are normally charged the same rates as;' 
the cargo loaded first,Because the mix of cargo cannot be 
quoted^jLow value goods are charged lower rates than high 
value products,The result is an average price that enables 
the shipowner to operate his vessel,Low value goods'freight 
rates do not cover,normally,the costs of their trasportation. 
The loss has to be offset by charging the high value goods, 
or the goods with an inelastic demand,higher rates,If the 
subsidising commodities will be taken away by their shippers
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from the conference,a rate increase will have to be intro­
duced. The chances of securing full loads in the back haul 
of a journey are not always feasible.Therefore,the shippers 
in one direction subsidize their colleagues from the other 
end of the route.
The fact that a tariff quotes identical rates for a 
range of ports also indicates that prices are averaged,and 
somewhere along the route one shipper bears a proportionately 
larger part of the rate than another,
(c
Loyalty Arrangements,
This is one of the tools used by conferences to fight 
competition and to secure steady flow of cargo.Loyalty to 
the conference is solicited by offering to shippers a posi­
tive reward for loyalty and/or inflicting penal"ties for 
disloyalty.The inducement to utilize conference lines'ves­
sels exclusively is either in the form of a deferred pay­
ment for a portion of the freight charges paid if the ship­
per fulfils certain conditions of loyalty to the conference 
lines during a prescribed intervening period or of initially 
charging to those shippers who sign a loyalty with confe­
rence rates lower than those charged to others who have not 
signed the contract. These refer to deferred rebate and dual 
rate contract accordingly.Other arrangements for charging 
lower rates to loyal shippers are less common and are 
usually designed for individual cases.
Loyalty arrangement in one form or another exist in most 
of the trades covered by conferences,except those where there
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is no outside competition in the conference's area of 
operation,nor an immediate possibility of such competi­
tion emerging,Even in the trades where loyalty arrange­
ments exist,there are usually ports or cargoes which are 
outside the scope of those arrangements thus ports to 
which the conferencedoes not wish to give a regular and 
adequate service are not included in the list of "confe­
rence ports" for the purpose of loyalty arrangements.
Items which are outside the purview of the loyalty
(«arrangements are quoted at net rates,Also open rate commodi­
ties are beyond the scope of the arrangements.
Under the deffered rebate system,a shipper who 
utilizes exclusively the vessels of the member lines of the 
conference for carriage of cargoes between the ports covered 
by the conference,and considered by the conference as 
conference ports for the purpose of assessing his loyalty 
to the conference ,is entitled to receive a rebate of a cer­
tain percentage of his total freight payments,The rebate 
is computed for a designated period (shipment period), 
u-sually three to six months,but is paid after a period 
(deferment period) of the samej'̂ ng-th following the ship­
ment period,on the condition that the shipper has given 
his exclusive support to the confernce lines,both during the 
shipment period and the deferment period.
The conferences sometimes tighten their hold over 
the shippers by increasing the percentage of deferred 
rebate (and simultaneously increasing the tariff rates.
to lower the net rates below
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so as not 
and/or by increasing the 
period,Normally,the conf 
with an opportunity to 1 
giving advance notice,wi 
rebates due to them from 
/\nother device to 
lower rates if they sign 
tronage to the conferenc
the previous level) 
length of the shipment/deferment 
erences do not provide shippers 
save the confernce,not even by 
thout losing the accumulated 
the. con'f ernce,
tie the shippers is to offer them 
a contract to provide exclusive p 
e lines,Lower rates to contract
a-
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shippers are offered under the 'dual rate'system and also 
under the immediate rebate system,Only the dual rate system 
is allowed in the conferences operating in the overseas r 
trades of the USA in which deferred rebates are proscribed. 
According to the US legislation, the dif f eren̂ tial between 
the contract and non-contract rates cannot exceed 15% 
of non-contract rates.
Contract rates are offered as an alternative to the 
deffered rebate system by many other conferences,Where ship­
pers are given a' choice between the two systems, the per­
centage of immediate rebate which is offered is less, gene­
rally one-half or one percent less,than the percentage of 
deferred rebate.
The ’.fundamental differences between the deferred 
rebate system and the contract/non-contract rates system 
are given below ;-
Deferred rebate system Dual rate system
- an offer from the confe­
rence — no contractual 
arrangement involved.
- shippers receive rebates 
from the conference as a 
reward for their loyalty 
but without contractual 
rights,
- a shipper is obliged to 
be loyal both during the 
shipment period and the 
deferment period.
a contractual arrangement 
between the conference lines 
and the shipper,
contract shippers are charged 
lower rates vis-a-vis non-con­
tract shippers as a right 
under the contract,
a shipper is obliged to be 
loyal only during the contract 
period.
ons can “ any revision in the terms of
conf e- the contract needs to be by
y. consent of both parties.
ng loya^- - the onus of iproving disloyal
shipper. ty is on the confernce.
re of - penalty -'li quidated damages
es. based on the shipment made o




no provision enabling 
the shipper to luithdrau) 
his support to the con­
ference by giving advance 
notice and still receive 
the accumulated rebates 
due to him,
conference does not 
undertake any contrac­
tual obligations towards 
the shippers as a part of 
the deferred rebates 
scheme.
provision for terminating 
the contractual arrange­
ment by either side on due 
notice -notice period 
usually being 90 days.
conference undertakes certain 
obligations towards contract 
shippers, viz.
i, a general obligation to 
provide a service adequate 
to meet the ordinary require 
ments of the trade;
ii, to give advance notice of 
rate changes (generally 90 
days);
iii, to give permission to use 
a non-conference is unable 
to provide space within a 
reasonable time.
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THE UN CODE OF CONDUCT
HT
CHAPTER \I
DEVELOPIVIEIMTS THAT LED TO THE EXISTENCE OF UN CODE
In March 1963, when the Governments of the West Euro­
pean Maritime powers and Japan met in London and agreed that 
the conference system was indispenable as a mean of enabling 
shipowners to provide shippers with regular and efficient 
services at stable rates; they adopted a resolution which 
recommended institutional negotiation between shippings'coun-
NT
cils and conferences. These developments encouraged the for­
mation of European Shipper Council and CENSA which represent 
the interests of European shippers and European shipowners 
accordingly
The Rochdale Committee 1967-70
In July 1967,the U.K.government set up the Committee 
of Inquiry into Shipping with the Rt Hon the Viscount Roch­
dale as chairman. The Committee's terms of reference were 
broad: " To review.... the organization and structure of the 
United Kingdom shipping industry, its methods of operation 
and any other factors which affect its efficiency and compe­
titiveness,...” The Committee 's report, published in 1970 
’’...concluded that as a condition of shipowners, whether UK 
or foreign, continuing to benefit from the operation of re­
strictive agreements relating to trade to and from the UK, 
members of comferences should collectively accept a published 
code of conference practice.” The Rochdale Committee was.
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infact, the first official body to suggest the need for a 
code, although some academic writers had proposed this a num­
bers of years previously.
The report of the Committee returned to the matter 
again in the chapter 'Role of government and recommended 
that the UK government ” should encourage the rapid adootion 
of a oode of conduct by conferences, and.... should initiate 
discussion of the possible content of an international treaty
•cembodying a code of shipping conduct.’!' The Committee also 
wrote that it had "...reached the conclusion that a multi­
lateral intergovernmental agreement on shipping will increas­
ingly be seen as desirable by all concerned with the future 
efficiency and prosperity of shipping. The type of agreement 
we have in mind would be one which established an agreed 
code of principles within which governments should develop 
their national shipping policies...". Finally, in the chapter 
'Summary of recommendations ^it was stated that "Members of 
conferences covering trade to and from the UK shoulld collec­
tively accept a published code of conference practice, which 
should contain provisions relating to the admission of new 
members, the publication of tariffs, the provision of infor­
mation about revenues and costs to representatives of the 
Government and of shippers, and conclusion with the Govern­
ment and shippers."
There was another development initiated by developing 
countries during this period of time. Within the UN, parti­
cularly within the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
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East ( nou; the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific), developing countries had begun to express their 
concern about the effects of conference practices, and in 1960 
even in the OEEC (now OECD) hard words were spoken against 
the system.
UNCTAD. 19B/i - 1971
The first occasion on which shipping questions were 
discussed in a truly representative international forum; this 
was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
held in Geneva in 1964. In the area of shipping, the Confe- ' 
rence adopted two Recommendations. The first stated that 
objective to promote understanding and cooperation in the 
field of shipping.'The second Recommendation, A Common Pleasure 
of Understanding on Shipping Questions, dealt directly with 
shipping conferences and stated that » the Liner Conference 
system is necessary in order to secure stable rates and re­
gular services." The Recommendation stressed the need for 
cooperation and proposed to establish consultation machinery 
■" with adequate procedures for hearing and remedying complaints 
by the formation of shippers'councils or other suitable bodies 
on a national and regional basis." The Recommendation suggested 
including in consultations the following matters: publication 
of conference tariffs and regulation, prior notice on sur- • 
charges and rate increase, loyalty agreements, conference re­
presentation in Developing countries, adequacy of service, 
improvement and promotion of Developing countries'Trades, and
5A
rationalization of routes, sailings, and freight. The Eommon 
Measure also dealt with port improvements and acceptance of 
DCs'carriers to conferences.
After the creation of UNCTAD as a part of the perma­
nent machinery of the UN, a Committee on Shipping was estab­
lished,- Its programme of wouk contained' a sub item concerned 
with conference practices and adequacy of shipping services, 
and it was noted that it might be desirable for the secreta­
riat ” to deal with some of these questions in more special- 
ized studies,"
The report by the secretariat, the Liner Conference 
System, was finished in time for the fourth session of the 
Committee in 1970. The report of the debate in the Committee 
notes that, since conferences were monopolistic and restricted 
competition, conference practices should be subject to govern­
ment regulation.” One representative noted ” that conferences 
by definition represented a denial of free competition and 
consequently had to be regulated by the governmental autho­
rities of the countries whose trade they served.” Even some 
representatives of developed countries ” maintained that ex­
perience in their countries suggested that certain abuses of 
the conference system could be prevented by government regu­
lation.”
The resolution adopted by the Committee ” Agrees that 
further improvements in the liner conference system are neces­
sary and would be in the common interests of shippers and . 
shipowners.” It was decided to transmit the secretariat
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study to the UNCTAD Working Group on International Shipping
Legislation (WGISL).
The WGISL considered the study at its second session 
in Febuary 1971. There were sharply divergent views expressed 
at the meeting; in general, the developed countries considered 
that, before the matter was discussed further at the technical 
level, it should be refered back to the Committee for discus­
sion of the policy issues involved; the developing and socia­
list countries considered that the matter was urgent particu—
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larly in view of the decisions adopted by CSP.' meeting in 
Tokyo,Japan (see below), held in the same month as the WGISL. 
The developing countries in particular stressed that, since 
they had not been invited participate in the formulation of 
the self-regulatory Code of conduct which it had been decided 
should be produced, UNCTAD needed to press ahead with its own 
work without delay. A resolution to consider the subject of 
conference practices at the third session of the WGISL and 
expressing ” the hope that its work on conference practices 
will lead to the formulation of internationally acceptable 
appropriate rules of conduct for Liner Conference" was adopted. 
In answer to the request made at this second session of the 
WGISL,the UNCTAD secretariat produced at the end of 1971 a 
further report, the Regulation of Liner Conferences. As its 
title implies, the report considered various methods of regu­
lating conferences, and concluded that the only method which 
would meet the criteria developed in the report itself was an 
international convention with provision for local and inter-
<»
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national arbitration for the settlement of disputes. It went 
on to examine the various deficiencies in current conference 
practices, drawing the material from the previous secretariat 
report, and to present solutions to rectify these deficiencies. 
The solutions formed, in themselves, a code (indeed the last 
chapter was called "Rules of conduct (code) for liner confe­
rences". ) These provisions were the origin of the Code of 
Conduct, and the form and structure suggested in the Regula­
tion of Liner Conferences can still be seen clearly^in the 
Code.
CSP r'leetinq in Jap^n
At the initiative of the UK government, CSP met in 
Tokyo on 2 and 3 Febuary 1971. Twelve countries were present 
and in the communique issued after the meeting they "...con­
firmed their view that the liner conference system played an 
essential role, and that it should continue to function by 
self regulation to the greatest possible extent." They agreed, 
however,that "...the time had come to determine what futher 
developments were needed in connection with liner conferences." 
They then resolved that :
a) it was essential that conferences should not only 
observe but also be seen to observe certain principles of 
fair practice?
b) they should promote the acceptance by conference of 
a published code of practice, which should take due account
■fof the criticisms against conferences;
CSP -(The Consultative Shipping Group) is a group consist
of the Western European and Japan ministers responsible for 
maritime transport.
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c) they should aim initially at acceptance of the code 
by conferences serving the trade of their countries while 
bearing in mind the ultimate objective that such a code should 
receive worldwide endorsement.
The governments present at the meeting requested their 
shipowners jointly toelaborate the details of a code of prac­
tice and to present them to the governments for further con­
sideration before 31 December 1971, The request for code of 
practice was believed to be intended particularly to meet the
«c
demands of developing countries. And the reason for the limit- 
ting the time for the draft was an attempt to be ready before 
the next UNCTAD meeting. The recommendation of the ministers 
contained a great deal which followed the Rochdale proposals. 
As a result the code developed by European and Japanese 
shipowners and'shippers was dated 3 November 1971, It was 
known,- as CENSA Code,
UNCTAD 1972 - 74
UNCTAD III The two streams came together at UNCTAD III 
held in Santiago,Chile, in April and May 1972, By now all 
countries accepted both the necessity for, and the inevita­
bility of, a code of conduct. But the overall agreement could 
not be reached; however Resolution 66 (III) was adopted. The 
Resolution stated that there was an urgent need for adopting 
and implementing a universally-acceptable code of conduct for 
liner conferences and requested the General Assembly to con­
vene a conference of plenipotentiaries as early as possible
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in' 1973 to adopt such a code. The draft code produced by 
the developing countries (the Santiago draft), was amended 
to the resolution.
Acting upon the Resolution, the UN General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 3035 (XXXUIl) which inter alia established 
a AS member preparatory committee which met for two sessions 
in January and June 1973 to prepare a text for submission ' 
to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, At the end of the 
second session of the preparatory Committee a proposed text 
of a’code of conduct emerged. There was widespread agreement 
on the headings to be included, as indeed there had been at 
Santiago, but the differences on a number of fundamental issues 
remained as wide as they had ever been. The proposed text 
submitted to the Conference, therefore, contained alternative 
texts for a large number of the provisions. Indeed, it would 
be fair to say that the work of the Preparatory Committee had 
been largely to array the alternatives rather than to resolve 
differences.
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries was scheduled to 
meet from 12 November to 1A December, However, it was not 
possible to complete the work in the period and accordingly 
one day was added to the first part of the Conference and a 
second part was scheduled from 11 to 29 March 1974, eventually 
extended to 6 April, When the final vote was taken 72 coun­




SOME KEY ISSUES REGARDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
1 • The structure of the Codê . ̂
The Code is in the form of a Convention annexed to 
the final Act of the Conference of Pleniootentiaries. A second 
annex to the Final Act contained three resolutions in that 
the terms of the Convention are binding on states ratifying 
it once it enters into force, whereas resolutions are opera­
tive once they are adopted, but are never binding on the 
countries which have voted for them.
The Code itself starts off with a statement of Objec­
tives and Principles. This is followed by seven chapters 
divided into two parts. Part One consists of five chapters 
and contains the substance of the Code, Part Two contains two 
chapters concerned with the implementation of the substance 
of Part One,
Part One begins with the definition of certain impor­
tant terms used in the Code, including such matters as a 
liner conference, a national shipping line and a third-country 
shipping line. The next chapter, "Relations among member 
lines," deals with membership of conferences, sanctions on 
conference members, self-policing and the availability of 
conference agreements. The articles of this chapter are highly 
controversial and constitute the main stumbling black to 
support for the Code from European countries. Chapter III 
deals with "Relations with shippers. " and has articles
covering loyalty arrangements^ the granting of dispensation 
to use non-conference vessels, the availability of tariffs 
and related conditions, annual reports, and very importantly, 
consultation machinery. One common element in all the various 
proposals for a code is the importance attached to consulta­
tion as a means of both avoiding and resolving disputes 
between conferences and shippers. In general. Chapter III 
is shown by the fact that most of the articles and paragraphs 
were adopted without objection by the Conference, «
Chapter IV deals with freight rate questions. It starts 
with criteria for freight rate determination, while subsequent 
articles deal with different questions related to freight 
rates. This chapter is the one most likely to give rise to 
disputes in the operation of the Code, not from any inade­
quacies in its provisions or drafting, although parts of 
article 14 in particular are rather obscure, but simply 
from the fact that freight rate questions are the cause of 
virtually all of the friction which occurs between conferen­
ces and shippers. It needs to be noted that none of the pa­
ragraphs of chapter lU contain the mandatory "shall” without 
qualification and that full provision is made for the parties 
concerned to agree on other criteria, procedures and time 
limits. Indeed, since in the end almost everything is per­
missible it is difficult to understand the controversy 
which the various articles raised.
Chapter IV is headed "Other matters” and is, in fact, 
something of a ragbag. There is an article- on fighting ships.
another on adequacy of service, articles on the head office 
of a conference and on representation, and finally an arti­
cle providing that conference agreements of whatever type 
shall conform to the applicable requirements of the Code,
The final chapter is headed “Final clauses,” This 
provides, under the article .on Implementation that "Each 
Contractiirtg Party shall take such legislative or other measures 
as may be necessary to implement the present Convention” 
(Article 47), A further article deals with signature, rati- 
fication, acceptance, approval and accession and is followed 
by one on the conditions for entry into force.
The first annex to the Convention contains model of 
procedure for international mandatory conciliation : these 
shall be considered as model rules for the guidance of 
conciliators...,” who may”,...use, supplement or amend the 
rules..,, or formulate their own rules of procedure.,,,” 
(Article 45 paragraoh 2), Clearly, nothing could be more 
flexible.
Annex II contains three resolutions adopted by the 
Conference. The first relates to the completion of the work 
of the conference and was necessitated by its failure to 
complete its work in one session as scheduled. The second 
resolution concerns non-conference shipping lines and atterripts 
to preserve the position of non-conference operators and the 
choice of shippers between conference and non conference 
lines. The third resolution deals with local conciliation, 
proposals for which were dropped by developirrg countries.
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presumably because there was insufficient time to negotiate 
them. This resolution '’Requests the first Review Conference 
,,,,to give priority consideration to the subject of local 
conciliation..,.”
2, Objectives and principles.
The Code states the fundamental objectives and basic
principles as following :
a. The objective to facilitate the orderly expansion of world 
sea-borne trade;
b. The objective to stimulate the development of regular 
and efficient liner services adequate to the requirements 
of trade concerned;
c. The objective to ensure a balance of interests between 
suppliers and users of liner shipping services;
d. The principle thart conference practices should not involve 
any discrimination against the shipowners, shippers or 
the foreign trade of any country;
e. The principle that conferences hold meaningful consultations 
with shippers^ organisations, shippers^ representatives
and shippers on matters of common interest, with upon 
request, the participation of appropriate authorities;
f. The principle that conferences should make available to 
interested parties pertinent information about their acti­
vities which are relevant to those parties and should ou- 
blish meaningful information on their activities.
However, it should be noted and emphasized that the objectives
of the Code can be found not only here in the preamble to 
the Code, but also the points of view expressed by delegates, 
particularly at the closing session of the conference of 
plenipotentiaries. Houpv/er, the below statements are summary 
of the answers to the question ; Why was the Code needed
a. remove from the conferences the power arbitraly to decide 
on the admission of new lines and thus whether or not 
shipping lines could operate in particular trades;
b. provide that the allocation of cargoes within conferences 
should take place on an internationally agreed basis 
rather than through the private arrangements by which 
shares were traditionally determined;
c. bring into open the levels of conference freight rates and 
the processes of conference decision taking;
d. restrict the powers of cartels formed lines, usually foreign 
to the country concerned, to take unilateral decisions on 
matters vitally affecting the trade development of these 
countries; and
e. establish an independent tribunal to which parties with 
complaints about the operation of the system could have 
recourse.
And also the princioles Governing the Code can be 
viewed from another angle :
1. Fundamentally, the Liner Code seeks to enable developing 
countries to achieve their aspirations in the field of 
liner shipping within the broad framework of a largely 
self-regulating system of liner conferences with the 
minimum level of government intervention.
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The system of international mandatory conciliation 
for the settlement of disputes itself has also been drafted 
in a manner as to be compatible with the pervading spirit 
of the code which is to find mutually acceptable solutions 
to problems through amicable means,
2, Basing itself largely on the principle of a self-regula
ting system of liner conferences, the code provides through
its Articles a set of principles relating to :
a, membership of liner conferences
««
b, cargo sharing arrangements within conferences
c, internal rules of conferences
d, relations between shippers and conferences including 
consultation machinery
e, freight rates and surcharges
f, dispute settlement machinery
These orovisions, while seeking to find solutions to 
the legitim§£e.-:grievances of developing countries, whether 
in their efforts to develop their liner fleets or in their 
efforts to obtain for their shippers a fair deal from con­
ferences, have drawn upon the best of conference practices 
and should present no difficulty in their practical- applica­
tion, In fact, in their relations with shippers many confe­
rences have already for sometime, been gearing themselves 
to the provisions of the Code, Similarly the principles of 
cargo sharing enumerated in the Code today have general 
acceptance in conference circles,
3, A feature which runs through the Code in all its clauses 
is its flexibility. With regard to virtually all the
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fundamental clauses such as cargo sharing, period between 
freight rate increases, settlement of disputes etc. there 
is provision for adopting alternative solutions by mutual 
agreement
A. Another significant element of the Code is the role 
assigned to the " appropriate authorities ” of Government, 
While accepting that Governments have a right to particir* 
pate in certain matters such as consultations between 
shippers and conferences, the role envisaged for "appro- 
priate authorities ” is essentially a low profound one - 
a consultative role more than a decision making one,
5, While the Code is essentially an instrument which 
applies to liner conferences,the authors of the Code accepted 
the right of outsiders to operate in competition with Con­
ferences, This fact is illustrated by Resolution Number 2 
on the subject of Non-Conference Shipping Liner adopted by 
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries at the time the Code 
itself was adopted in April 1974. This resolution while 
reiterating that the Code was prepared with a view to im­
proving the liner conference system, and that the Code is 
applicable to liner conferences and their external rela­
tions, states explicitly that nothing in the Code shall be 
construed so as to deny shippers the option of using non­
conference lines, subject to any loyalty agreements where 
they exist and as long as outside lines operate on the 
basis of ” fair competition on a commercial basis.”
BB.
3i. Character of the Code
I ,
I', The Code accepts the diversity existing within the con­
ference system, thereforsi. when coming t̂o the applica­
tion,. It is a question of finding the particular mqan 
appropriate for appling its principles to the specific' 
ponference.
The Code was designed to right old wrongs, which are not 
necessarily the same as the current wrongs which need
righting. - ' » '
} It is important to bear in mind in assessing the Code 
in relation to current shipping practices,namely, that it 
was designed to right old wrongs and, in doing so,was 
based on a Secretariat report completed iq 19B9 and,thus, 
basically referring to the system current in about 1965, 
to that extent the Code was out date when it was adopted.
3, speed with which the Code was adopted has resulted
in some ambiguities of wording which will require care- 
ful .interpretation in application,
I • ,
1 In 1971, the preparation of the Code of Conduct did 
commence, and in just three years the Code was adopted.
Some of the difficulties regarding its application stem
, !
from this haste to bring the instrument to fruition,
4, The Code is flexible. It rarely imposes, and very rarely 
hectors by the use of the word "shall" , and then only
1
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in connection with principles to observe,rather than 
■with practices to adopt. This is a strength because it 
does not tie the hands of parties to world liner ser­
vices, If in a particular trade the parties agree to 
follow practices other than those suggested in the Code,
.they will be acting absolutely in accordance with .the 
Code so long as the agreement was not imposed by the 
stronger party on the weaker.
In the absence of any record of the debates,interpreta­
tion must take into account every piece 'of interpreta­
tive material, even if not juridicial.ly sound. One other 
problem which will arise in the application of the Code 
is that there are no official records of the debates,
s
It was decided very early in the proceedings leading 
to the conference of Plenipotentiaries that the debates 
should not take place.in public session,which meant that 
no record was made of the discussions. With most national 
laws and international agreements there is eithera full 
record of the debates or an agreed set of minutes.
Without these,there will be no officially agreed or 
accepted way of knowing what the intentions of dele­
gates were and so no guidance, other than the text of
* the Code itself,
‘ (7)4,The scope of Application of the Code
1, The preamble to the Code underlines its applicability 
to liner conferences in 7 of the 9 paragraphs contained 
in that section;thus it seems that the Code applies to
■i
liner conferences,but not to lines or trades which are 
not organised in a conference. Similarly Chapter 1 de­
fines "goods carried by the conference" as any "cargo 
transported by shipping lines members of a conference 
in accordance with the conference agreement," This 
wording,too,indicates that only cargo transported as 
enumerated will be subject to the order of the Code, 
consequently,the Code does not apply to shipping lines 
that erre not members of a conference or to cargoes 
carried by members lines other than in accordance with 
the conference agreement. This conclusion is a contro­
versial one. At the time when the Code was drafted, 
conferences ' were -• identified with liner trade. Con­
ferences played--'k j dominant role,carrying 90 percent 
of liner cargoes. But now conferences are carrying just 
half of the trade. So another interpretation try to base 
on the intentions of the drafters of the Code that the 
Code be apnlied to almost the whole part of liner trade. 
The use of expressions such as " trade" and "conference 
services" beeing almost interchangeable during those 
debates before/after the Code was adopted.
Article 2 deals with the participation of various ship­
ping lines,Article 2(l7) widens and delineates the scope 
of cargo to which the Code is applicable by stating 
that the provisions of the 16 previous subsections 
of this article,which deals with the manner of regu­
lating participation in the trade,concern "all goods
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regardless of their origins,their destination or 
the use for which they are intended,with the excep­
tion of military equipment for national defence pur­
poses”,This indicated that the Code applies to allby
goods carried conferences irrespective of whether 
the goods ariginate in the ^fpountry in which the 
loading port is situated or whether they are destined 
to the country in which the discharging port is situated,
3, The Code applissto what are now called "self-reguTated" 
conferences,i,e, conferences which do not serve-US- 
:.vtype regulated liner trades,since clearly Conferences 
which are publicly regulated comprehensively inwards 
and outwards inconsistently with the provisions of the 
Code would fall outside the scope of the Code for so 
long as non-contracting party states overtly reject it, 
and do'. not permit its provisions to apply within their 
claimed national jurisdictions. By the same token a 
State., might not be a Contracting Party,yet acquiesce 
in the functioning of the Code within its jurisdiction. 
Some one—third of all conferences serve US liner trades 
which are regulated inwards and outwards by statute law 
and regulation. The Code would thus prima facia only 
apply to the remaining two-thirds of the world^s con­
ferences for so long as the USA or other non-contracting 
state party does not accept or acquiesce in the opera­
tion of the Code within its claimed jurisdiction. Liner 
Conferences trading with such countries would continue
to function as they do today.
4. Another question which may be of considerable importance 
i# the application of the Code to cargoes covered by 
bilateral trade agreements. While no clear provision
of the Code refers to this matter,the COMECON countries, 
which have already adhered to the Code;have done so with 
the reservation that cargo covered by bilateral or inter­
government agreements is specifically excluded. This 
attitude was fore-shadowed by an authoritative comervtator
•C
on the Code shortly after it had been acceptedjwho wrote: 
"In light of the 'statements made to the Diplomatic Con­
ference it is plain that such agreements would prima 
facie be exempt from the Code."
5, The Council of the ^^uropean Communities, in May 1979,adopted 
a resolution which s'ets out the common position of EEC 
countries to the Code and also a model reservation which 
EEC countries will make in adopting the Code, Under this 
reservation;
- Article 2 of the Code dealing with the principles
of partieipation in trade (cargo sharing,berthing/sailing 
schedules etc. )
- Article 3 dealing with conference decision making 
procedure;and
- Article 1 clause 9 specifying a minimum period of 
15 months for the interval between general freight rate 
increases;are excluded from application to intra EEC 
trade and also to trades between EEC states and other
e ‘ 70.
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OECD counteies, subject to reciprocal agreements.
The implications of this reservation are:
(a) EEC shipping lines will be treated on a common 
footing with regard to cargo sharing rights irrespective 
of specific nationality,insofar as all intra EEC confe­
rence trades are concerned. In short,for the purposes
of the Code,the EEC could be deemed to be a single country 
insofar as intra EEC conference trades are concerned.
This principle would cover trades with OECD countries 
which sign^reciprocal agreements with the EEC.
(b) Shippers in intra EEC trades and EEC/OECD trades 
which are the subject of reciprocal agreement will not 
have the right to a 15 month minimum freeze period bet­
ween freight rate increases,
(c) The'.EEC reservation does not however negate the 
rights accruing under the Code to extra EEC third flag 
countries to participate in intra EEC trades.
6, By and large the Code will be effective in respect of:
- conference trades between developing countries and 
developed market economy countries which are Contracting 
Parties,
- conferences trades between developing countries 
which are Contracting Parties,
The immediate practical impact will no doubt be on 
conference trades between developed market economy and de­
veloping countries. In the long run,however, as the trade 
between developing countries increases,the Code will naturally
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become more important as an instrument which regulates ship­
ping relations between developing countries according to the 
principle of equality of nations,
(9)5.The Wain Provisions and its Application
a), nembership in Conferences,
Membership of lines in conferences is dealt with i 
in Article 1 of Chapter 2,Membership in a conference had 
once been a basic prerogative of the shipping lines forming 
that bodyjnow under the Code,it is to be regulated iQ ac­
cordance with principles to be established by an inter­
national convention,rather than the consensus of the 
members•
The Code distinguishes between national shipping 
lines,which are defined in Chapter 1 as ”a vessel-opera- 
ting carrier which has its head office of management and 
its effective control in that country,and is recognized 
as such by an appropriate authority of that country or 
under the law of the country” and shipping lines which 
are not national•lines and which are referred to as 
"third-country shipping lines",
A national line has an aut’6 matic right to a full 
member in a conferance which serves the foreign trade of 
his country,f^aragraph 2 of Article 1 entitles a national 
shipping line seeking admission to a conference to include 
the use of chartered tonnage as evidence of its ability 
and intention to provide regular services,Third-country 
shipping lines,on the other hand,must not only own ves­
sels but also overcome the hurdl.es- a subjective analy-
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sis of the need for the admission of such a line,the 
guidelines for which examination are defined in Article 
1 (3 ).Lip service is paid to the principle that decisions 
on membership apolication are not to be taken in an arbi­
trary manner;an obligation is imposed on the conference 
to give in writing the grounds for a refusal (Article 
1 (4 )),The conference is also instructed to take into ac­
count the views put forward by shippers^organization of 
the countries whose trade is carried by the conference 
(Article l(5)),The assumtion is that such organizations 
will,in general,encourage competition,in so far as it is 
possible within the confines of a conference,by favoring" 
the admission of additional lines.
Attention should be drawn to one of the criteria 
provided for the admission of non-national lines,Article 
1 (3)(d) 'states that one criterion is "current partici­
pation of the shipoing line in trade on the same route 
or routes outside the framework of a conference",The 
primary intention in maintaining outsiders is to check 
conferences^efficiency and to give an option to shippers 
to ship their goods with outsiders if needed.
The assumption that the Code foresees and tole—- 
rates the continued existence of outsider, sevices is 
further strengthened by the fact that Article 7 devotes 
considerable space to loyalty arrangements to be set up 
between the conference and the shippers,And,it was pre­
sumed that loyalty arrangements will go on to be an _
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effective device to fight competition from outsiders,
b). Cargo Sharing Provisions,
Article 2 of the Code is headed "Participation 
in trade".The provisions of this article have been the 
most controversial,Article 2(4) states that,unless 
otherwise mutually agreed,the following principle regar­
ding the right of lines to participate in the trade car­
ried must be observed:-
- The group of national shipping lines of each of two 
countries the foreign trade between which is carried 
by the conference shall have equal rights to partici­
pate in the freight and volume of traffic generated 
by the mutual foreign trade and carried by the confe­
rence ;
- third-country shipping lines,if any,shall have the 
right to acquire a significant part,such as 20^,in 
the fTeight and volume of traffic generated by that 
trade.
The two paragraphs above, were, wellknown as 40-40-20 
formula.
Article 2(5) makes provision for a case in which 
there is no national shipping line in one of the countries 
concerned;that country's^share shall be distributed among 
the individual member lines in proportion to their respec­
tive share.
Article 2(B) makes another case when one of the 
national ship.oing lines decide not to carry its full share
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of trade.
Article 2(7) for the unlikely event when the natio­
nal shipping lines ef-tuio countries do not participate in 
the trade between those countries which aV.e covered-tiy 
conference.
The Code regards all national shipping lines existing 
in one country and serving a particular trade as a block, 
entitled to the same percentage of the trade as the group 
of national shipping lines of the other country^sThe dividing 
up of the piece of the cake allocated to that group among 
its participant members is left to "mutual agreement", 
which presumably means the customary commercial process 
that lines now apply when distributing shares in a confe­
rence trade. The division of shares among third-country 
shipping lines appears to be left to commercial negotiations 
among those lines more by implication than by express pro­
visions, •-
The code displays a marked preference for pooling 
arrangements to:.form .the basic cargo-sharing provisions.
As Article 2(2) states:”when a conference operates a pool, 
all shipping lines member of the conference ,,..shall 
have the right to participate in the pool.,.,". Article 
2 (a ), as already cited, lay down the principle for deter­
mining the share of individual member lines. The pooling 
theme is continued in Article 2 (l 3):.-"Where no pooling, 
berthing, sailing or other trade participation agreements 
exist in a conference, either group of national shipping 
lines, members of the conference, may require that pooling
76.
arrangements be introduced The alternative to pooling 
arrangements forseen by the articles in an adjustment of 
sailings, desigeedcto provide substantially the same 
rights to participants in the trade as they would have 
enjoyed had there been a pool.
Article 2 (2 ) above put an end to the situation in 
which they are first and second class members in a.'.eonference. 
In a passage in this article of particularly obscure 
drafting, the groups of national shipping lines of the
«C
country at each end are given a majority vote in enforcing 
such a decision within the conference. A strict time limit 
of a period not exceeding six months from the receipt of 
the request is set for setting up a pool or appropriate 
alternative arrangements. In the event of disagreement 
between the national shipping lines of the countries concerned, 
what is in effect and appeal to the appropriate authorities 
of these countries to bring their weight to bear in the 
matter is contained in Article 2(lA), As a last resort, 
disputes on this matter are to be dealt with in accordance 
with the conciliation procedure of the Code,
Some problems regarding the application of cargo sharing. 
There are disputes ariŝ g' regarding the scope of 
application of cargo sharing. There are two different inter­
pretations as following:
1, Applying the cargo sharing provisions to the conference 
market share of the trade;




One important point in all of this is that when 
the Code was adopted outsiders were relatively unimportant. 
Today, they may carry as much as 30^ overall.
Those who are in favour of the first interpretation 
are mainly the traditional maritime countries, especially 
those with strong traditional cross-trading operations.
And also, shippers from many countries who fear that if 
the cargo sharing ig - applied to the total liner trade, 
there will be no alternative for them other than to ship 
their goods with conference vessels. The primary criteria 
of the code that indeoendent lines be maintained to check 
the efficiency of conference operation will be eliminated. 
And, the problem will arise that who will ■ ' control the 
checking and maintaining the record of loadings of outsiders 
normally in respect of cargo sharing, in those conferences 
where the system was installed, the conferences, usually 
through a special pool secretariate, was responsible for 
three distinct tasks, namely:
- To fix the share in the traffic of each member;
- To maintain a record of the loadings of each member;
- To operate a system wherby over-carriers compensated 
under-carriers.
Clearly that any cargo sharing system must be 
administered. The conference should occupy itself with the 
task. Indeed, if cargo carried outside the conference is 
to be subject to the cargo sharing rules, the conference 
can not do the job.
But if we let free outsiders to oompete with confe-
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rence and allocates the cargo share from cargoes carried 
by conferences. We might find soon that many conferences 
will dissolve, ffnd, future liner services will be dominated 
by strong outsiders with advanced and modern vessels. In 
contrast with conferences, national shipping lines of 
developing countries are weakening.
c). Freight rates.
Chapter four of the Code convention, entitled "Freight 
rates", contains articles 12-17 inclusive. Articles 12 and
iC
14 of which can regarded as the crucial ones and thus 
warrant emphasis. Article 12, named "Criteria for freight 
rate determination" sets forth four criteria for the pur­
pose of determining freight rates. It stipulates that "in ' 
arriving at a decision on questions of tariff policy..,, 
the following points shall, unless otherwise provided, be 
taken into account", then it specifies the first criterion 
declaring that:
"Freight rates shall be fixed at as low a level as 
is feasible from the commercial point of view, and shall 
permit a reasonable profit for shipowners;"
The second criterion is as follows:
"The cost of operations of conferences shall, as a 
rule, be evaluated for the round voyage of ships, with the 
outward and inward directions considered as a single whole. 




The third criterion by stating that : •
” the freight rates should take into account, 
among other factors,the nature of cargoes,the inter­
relationship between weight and cargo measurement, as 
well as value of cargoes";
The fourth criterion relating to fixing promo­
tional freight rates and/or special freight rates for 
specific goods,conference shall take into account the 
conditions of trade for these goods of the countries
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particularly developjjng and land-locked countries.
Some of these criterion seem to be'RBndatory as 
we can see from the uses of the word "shall" but allways 
there is an escape clause as in this case "uhless otherwise 
provided" is used,One point which is not clear is the 
Code is silent on the person or persons by whom the 
otherwise alternative criteria can be provided,Never­
theless , there should be no problem as it can be safely 
interoreted that the alternative criteria to be provided 
by shinocrs and conferences tlsr.ough the consultative pro­
cess.
Another observation is that the part of the first 
criterion requiring freight rates to be fixed at as low as 
commercially possible and to permit a resonable profit.
In a general sense,this criterion is clear and coincides 
with the Code's objective to facilitate the orderly expan­
sion of world sea-borne trade,although quantification may 
give problems,particularly of expressions such as "as low
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as possible ” and ” reasonable”,Hou to determine them?.
The Round l/oyaqe Concept
At first uje should knota why wes the round 
voyage concept introduced into the Code? It was intro­
duced into the Code in order to insure that shipoers 
c"uld take into account the allocation of costs between 
the different rates of the journey and that freight rates
on one leg are not fixed in isolation from those on the
(«
other,There is evidence that where consultation is weaker 
in a developing country at one end of a trade than in 
a developed country at the other end of that trade, 
freight rate increases tend to be larger in the outward 
than in the inward trade of that developing country.
This is another reasonable question to be discussed but 
again the question is,how far it is practicable?
It is concerned with the calculation of the ope­
rational costs of a conference.The criterion states that 
the cost ” be evaluated for the round voyage of ships, 
with the outward and inward directions considered as a 
single whole”.The Co'de does not furnish any indication 
concerning the circumstances under which the two voyages 
could be separated for making the calculations of the
voyage costs,
are
There/difficulties in evaluating costs under this 
concepts,There are certain problems in costing arising 
from the nature of liner operations.
Certain costs can be attributed directly to the cargo carried, 
and so are easy to handle^cargo handling costs are a clear 
example. Other costs can be directly attributed to the voyage, 
for example,fuel costs,stores consumed,since these costs 
would have been avoided had the voyage not been made .Finally, 
there are the costs which are common to the organization but 
cannot,except arbitrarily,be attributed to specific activi­
ties; the most important of these are capital costs. Then 
We- come to the allocation of cost among voyages. There are
Mr
three problems: The first is to determine how much of the 
general overheads ^ach voyage should bear. The second is to 
determine how the direct costs of each voyage, including its 
overhead share,are to be allocated between the constituent 
parts of the voyage. The criterion of the Code basically 
addresses itself to the second problem. Thus,in their con- 
sult3tions, all parties would be concerned with the allocation 
of the attributed voyage costs over the various legs of the 
voyage, as well as with the allocation of ” leg ” costs over 
cargo items,which,in the oast, has been their sole concern. 
However, the first problem cannot be ignored and the distri­
bution of general overheads is a rich source of potential 
conflict,particularly with capital costs of between 40 and 
50 percent of annual costs for container and ro-ro shipping, 
compared with 20 to 30 percent of conventional liners. What 
have been mentioned above would be more difficult if it 
involvec/many ships belonging to many companies in a conference. 
Those ships are not the. same and are switched between trades
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in response to variations in the demand for tonnage and a 
number of ports in different countries are served.
In some actual cases, the shippers^council and the 
conference together chose groups of representative shipp 
and used only this costs to determine the overall situation. 
The various problems which are involved do not des­
troy the usefulness of the round voyage concept; but their 
solution inevitably introduces arbitrary elements into the 
costing. The question of how-, indirect costs are allocated
Mr
between the constituent sections of a voyage is one of de­
terminants in the level of freight rates to be charged on 
each of these. The greater the arbitrary element, the less 
the cost figures used to justify the level of freight rates 
represent reality.
There are more than one group of shippers from 
different countries at both end of the trade fenvolved.The 
consufetions regarding freight rates for the outward trip 
and for the return trip,do not take place at the same time, 
nor at the same place,while the shippers are not the same 
at two consultations. The common element is the conference, 
which immediately increases the power of the conference re­
lative to that of the shippers. It is very possible that 
the presentation of "an aggregated analysis of data regard­
ing relevant costs and revenues which in the opinion of the 
conference necessitate an increase in freight rates’.' arti­
cle 1A (3 ) would reinforce the power of the conference 
because it obliges the shippers themselves to propose the
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division of the costs between the two voyages,something for 
which they are not well qualified. It is for this reason 
that we have insisted on the conference itself making the 
proposed division even if, in -a normal situation, any di­
vision of costs,of whatever type, bears arbitrary elements.
Conference Tariffs and Classification of Tariff Rates 
It is worthwile to look briefly at Article 13, which 
states in part that ’Conference Tariffs should be drawn up 
simply and clearly; containing as few -elasses/categories 
as possible,.,” and in order to facilitate,:statistical com­
pilation and analysis. The corresponding appropriate code 
number of the item should be indicated in accordance with 
the Standard International Trade Classification,the Brussels 
Tariff Nomenclature or any other nomenclature that may be 
internationally adopted.
There is no problem with this and it would be useful 
to have commodities tied to the Brussels nemenclature, or 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SlTC),or 
other international nsmenclature. This would help to make 
tariffs easier to understand. The adoption of the same system 
for the tariffs and the cargo manifests by the port and by 
the customs would not only facilitate statistical collection 
but also reduce problems of accidental improper declarations 
gt the customs.Further it will simplify international trade 
movements and shippers-shipowners negotiations. And finally 
the BTN makes it easier to classify commodities and thus 
assists in eliminating the use of the arbitrary NOS rates.
General Freight ~ Rate INCREASES
Article 1A concerning the process of general freight 
rate increases, Let^s explain by. dividing it into 2 main 
parts :
J, Notification of intention. Article 14 (l) when a 
Conference has intention to increase general freight rate, 
the Code requires that the Conference shall give advance 
notice of not less than 150 days or otherwise agreed period 
to those interested parties,of its intention to effect ,a 
general increase in freight rates. The notice shall indicate 
the extent of the increases,the date of effect and the rea­
sons supporting the proposed increase.
Those interested parties are shippers^organizations 
or representatives of shippers and/or shippers and where so 
required,to appropriate authorities of the countries whose 
trade is served by the Conference,
2, Consultation, Article 1A (2) the next step is for 
consultations to be held at the request of those interested 
parties described above to be made within an agreed period 
of time after receipt of the notice and ''consultations shall 
commence within a stipulated period not exceeding 30 days 
or as .previously agreed between the parties concerned,"
Before going on, we should note that three problems 
of apolication already arise,namely:
- that a single shipper,even if he is of a minor status, 
or only occasionally sending cargoes,has the power to request 
consultations even in the face of a refusal from all other
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parties ’'prescribed in this Code";
- the period of time allowed to the shippers is not sti­
pulated in the Code; and
- it seems that the 30 days term does not enter into
c
force until after the axpiration of the non-stipulated term; 
however,the text as regardsrthis question is not clear.
As regards the third problem,common sense indicates 
that the two terms should be consecutive and that the second 
one does not include the first. But the article does not 
support common sfense because it reads: ” if no agreement 
is reached within 30 days of the giving of notice in accor­
dance with article 1A(l),.,the matter shall be submitted 
immediately to international mandatory .conciliation, in 
accordance with chapter VI , Article 1A (5), Therefore the 
30 days period appears to contain everything.
Paragraph 3 of the article speaks about a " report 
from independent accountants of repute," the preparation 
of which " any of the parties " has the right to request 
" in an effort to expedite consultations ", The Conference 
can submit,if it so wishes,such a report without awaiting 
the request of anyone. The report should be submitted to 
the participabts "where practicable,reasonably before the 
consultations," At this point, it sound strange that how 
can one ever imagine that a report which is made in order 
to expedite the consultations and which does not reach its 
destination in sufficient time prior to the starting of 
consultations to enable the shippers to study it " be accepted
as one of the bases of consultation ?" There is no question 
of ”if possible.”
And a 30 day term giv/en to undertake the following 
actions is sound insufficient:
- the receipt of the request by the conference;
- the given of an assignment to the accountants with 
all necessary information;
- the preparation of the report;
- the sending of^the report to the conference; ^
- the study of the report by the conference;
- the sending of the reoort to all designated parties;
and
- study of the report by the shippers.
And to undertake the study of the report, we should 
expect on event that the shippers use other accountants, 
equally capable, in order to explain the report elaborated 
by the first. Because ,in accounting,there always be many 
points which are arbitrary and are established on a basis 
of hypothesis which are unlikely to be explained in the 
report.
One of the most controversial provisions of the Code 
in the matter of freight rates is the 15 month freight rate 
freeze,“subject always to the rules regarding surcharge and 
regarding adjustment in freight rates consequent upon divided 
into two parts,namely, 150 days notice period plus 10 months 
between the date when one general freight rate increase be­
comes effective and the day of notice of the next general
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freight rate i n c r e a s e A r t i c l e  14(9))
Those provisions received quite a list of criticisms. 
One of them is ” the Code mandates rate increases every 
fifteen months a naive attempt to control and stabilize 
costs.... however,economic realities will induce exactly 
the opposite effects. Carriers will most assuredly post 
hefty increases on schedules every fifteen months,both 
in anticipation of high costs in the future and to compen­
sate for what they perceive to have been a shortfall in
<«
the prior term,”
A question might be raised here is will the condi­
tions for general freight rate increases lead to greater 
use of surcharges,increases for particular clauses oficargo, 
and/or substantial rate increases which seek to affect un­
known future costs increases every 15 months ? 
d). Relation with shipoers •
The third chapter of the Code Convention is entitled 
"Relations with shippers” Article 7 deals with loyalty arr­
angements, Article 7(l) requires that these "arrangements 
shall be based on the contract system or any other system, 
which is also lawful.”
Given that the original intention was that with the 
Code the deferred rebate system should be abolished as a 
form of loyalty tie. If a country has ratified the Code and 
want to outlaw the deferred rebates. It would be advisable 
to make the matter clear in the implementing legislation
since normally anything not declared unlawful# So,to para-
'is lawful.
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phrase the Code,the legislation might read; IDhe shipping 
lines members of a conference are entitled to institute and 
maintain loyalty arrangements with shippers based on the 
contract system.”
In practices nowaday,relatively few conferences ope­
rate loyalty systems.lt is resulted from the emergence of 
strong outsiders that make loyalty arrangements ineffeo- 
tive.Those outsiders provided regular and reliable ser­
vices with lower freight rates which means immediate discount 
without entering contracts. Anyway it might be that conferen­
ces attempt to reinstitute loyalty systems,Conferences, 
if denied the right to use loyalty systems, would be 
left powerless,Thus,it seems appropriate that conferences 
should retain the power to establish loyalty systems,but 
to orovide that " the form and terms are matters for
consultation between the conference and shippers' organi­
zation or representatives of shippers and appropriate 
authorities” (see /Article 7 (l).
Article 8 headed"Dispensation”
Dispensation has always been a thorny problem and 
will continue to be.The Code requires that conferences 
shall examine and give a decision quickly the request 
by dispensation,And if the dispensation is withheld, the 
conference shall give reason^ in writtigg,Clearly,what is 
quickly for the shioowner may not be quick enough for 
the shipper.At the same time,shippers cannot expect under­
standing from the conference if their own request is
frivolous- or dubious;it is alleged that shippers sometimes 
hold back shipments so that they miss a conference sailing 
and then ask for dispensation to ship en an advertised 
non-conference vessel.
Article 11 dealt with Gonsultation Machinery,
It institutionalizes the machinery of consultations 
and leaves no escape to either conferences or shippers 
as it makes it mandatory or compulsory when it states:
” there shall be consultations on matters of com­
mon interest' between a conference, shippers^*or-- 
ganizations,representatives of shippers...,, 
these consultations shall take place whenever re­
quested by any of the above-mentioned parties",
and that:
" consultations shall be held before final decisions 
are taken", 
and farther:
" appropriate authorities shall have the right, 
upon request,to participate fully in the consul­
tations,but this does not mean that they play a 
decision-making role".
Article 11(2 ) lists matters that may be the subject 
of consultation:
a) - Changes in general tariff conditions and related
regulations;
b) - Changes in the general level of tariff rates and rates
for major commodities;
c) - Promotional and/or special freight rates;
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d) - Imposition of,and related changes in,surcharges;
e) - Loyalty arrangements,their establishment or changes
in their form and general conditions;
f) - Changes in the tariff classification of ports;
g) - Procedure for the supply of necessary infdrmation
by shippers concerning the expected volume and 
nature of their cargoes;and
h) - Presentation of cargo for shipment and the requirements
regarding notice of cargo availability,
qr
Article 11(3) says that " to the extent that they 
fall within the scope of activities of a conference,the 
following matters may also be the subject of consultation:-
a) “ Operation of cargo inspection services;
b) - Changes in the pattern of services;
c) - Effects of the introduction of new technology in the
carriage of cargo,in particular unitization,with con­
sequent reduction of conventional service or loss of 
direct services;and
d) - Adequacy and quality of shipping services,including
the impact of pooling berthing or sailing arrangements 
on the availability of shipping services and freight 
rates at which shipoing services are provided;changes 
in the areas served and in the regularity of calls by 
conference vessels.
The two last items c) and d) are particularly 
important and relevant to many developing countries^ 
trades where such trades are served as by -products of
other trades.
A case comes to mind here is the containerazition
of conference services in such trades which both left a 
number of shippers dissatisfied because on account of the 
very nature of their cargoes they, would still have to 
rely on conventional services,and increased.the overall 
cost of transportation of the cargoes which lend them­
selves to containerization.
One problem within consultations is the big shippers
and the small shippers may have widely different point of
*'€view on some issues.This may arise from genuinely diffe­
rent interests which need to be taken into account -for 
example,small shippers generally fill the need for much _ 
greater service frequency than large shippers,But the dif­
ferent points of view may arise from ignorance and the 
fact that the small shippers are generally less well in­
formed than the large shippers and are likely to have a 
shorter time horizon,Then the point cannot be ignored n.’ 
that large shippers are frequently able to make their 
own arrangements with the shipping lines and the con­
ferences and then may be perfectly willing to stand 
aside and allow the conference to reomup'. from the small 
shippers what it has given away to large shippers.
Even though this article attempts to protect ship­
pers through requiring a consultative machinery before 
decision are made,it is not without problems or weaknesses 
which must be dealt with when putting the Code into ope­
ration,particularly-in developing countries,Since effective
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consultations are not possible unless all parties are 
equally informed, and given the fact that shippers^ cour-» ̂ 
cils in develooing countries,if existing at all,generally 
lack the necessajr.y financial resources and manpower sup­
port to effectively orepare themselves for negotiations 
with conferences,
e). Provision and r'lachinery for Settlement of Disputes,
Part 2 Chapter Ml of the Code devotes for "provi- 
tions and machinery for settlement of disputes".The Cg,de 
provide for the settlement of disputes that may arise 
out the implementation of the Code through a process of 
international mandatory conciliation,The principles'and 
procedures to be observed in this regard are spelled out 
in 23 articles,from Article 23 to Article 45,
In normal English usage,conciliation is a process 
by which a third party attempts to bring the disputants 
to agreement,The conciliator does not make an award or a 
r e^comindation, In- a successful conciliation the role of 
the conciliator is normally invisible,In arbitration,on 
the other hand,the arbitrators,after listening to both 
sides in a dispute and collecting and weighting such 
further evidence as they see fit,which would usually inclu­
ded evidence concerning the practices of the trade,pro­
duce a ruling,In advance of the arbitration proceedings 
both parties agree that,having accented to go to arbitra­
tion and on the identity of the arbitrator or of the arbi­
tration panel,they will accept the award.
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International mandatory conciliation is neither of 
these things. It is like arbitration in that a decision is 
given; it is like conciliation in that there is no prior 
commitment to acceptance. The parties agree on the aopoint- 
ment of the conciliator or of the panel of conciliators, a 
recommendation is mdde and then the parties either accept 
it or reject it. Thus, not only is a new concept in juris­
prudence introdaced, but a new meaning is given to a well- 
established word referring to a well-established practice. 
The process provided in the Code for the settlement 
of a dispute on a major question is consultation,normal 
conciliation, international mandatory conciliation. ’’The 
parties to a dispute shall first attempt to settle it by 
an exchange of views or direct negotiations..,"(see Article 
23 (3 )); clearly,consultation is included in the exchange 
of views or direct negotiations",but the provision is pro­
perly wider. In fact the Code provisions encourage recourse 
to all possible avenues of settlement before embarking on 
international mandatory conciliation,which is to be seen 
as a last resort.
At first,let's look at the parties whose disputes
fall into the scope of the application. The Code's dis­
pute settlement machinery applies to disputes between:
a) A conference and a shipping line;
b) Shipping lines which are members of a conference;
c) A conference or a shipping line which is a member 
thereof,and a shippers'organization or shippers,and
d) Two or more conferences;
and the matters regarding which disputes could be re— - 
fered to international mandatory conciliation are:
1 : refusal of admission of a national shipping line to 
a conference serving the foreign trade of the country 
of that shipping line;
2 : refusal of admission of a third country shipping line 
to a conference;
3 : expulsion from a conference;
A: inconsistency of a conference agreement with the Code;
5 : a general freight rate increase;
6 : surcharges;
7 : changes in freight rates or the composition of a cur­
rency adjustment factor due to exchange rate changes;
8 : participation in trade;
9 : the form and terms of proposed loyalty agreements.
The principle of the Code ^s international mandatory 
conciliation :
1 , International mandatory conciliation,under the Code,is 
applicable principally to dispute between parties belong­
ing to different nationalities. Parties of the same na­
tionality are expected to settle their differences through 
recourse to national law,unless this creates serious 
difficulties in the fulfilment of the provisions of the 
Code.
2. The basic feature of the Codes^dispute settlement regime 
is that it is a system of mandatory conciliation and not
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one of arbitration,the purpose of conciliation being 
to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute through 
recommendations formulated by independent conciliators. 
Conciliators are to be drawn from an international panel 
of experts,each contracting party having the right to 
• nominate a total of 12 persons to the panel.
3. Article 25 provides that where conciliation proceedings 
has been initiated such proceedings shall have prece­
dence over national law. However,recommendations of con­
ciliators are not binding in that any party to a 'Sispute 
has the right,by giving reasons, to accept or reject a 
recommendation made by conciliators. The party refusing 
to accept a recommendation would then be free to seek 
redress by other means including access to national law 
as appropriate.
4. Where parties to a dispute have accepted a recommendation 
by conciliators,the Contracting Parties concerned are 
expected to enforce such recommendations except where
a court or other competent authority of the country 
where enforcement is sought found that:
- any party which accepted the recommendation was 
under some legal incapacity at the time of acceptance;
- fraud or coercion has been used in the making of 
the recommendation;
- the recommendation is contrary to public policy 
in the country of enforcement,or
- the composition of the conciliators,or conciliation
procedure,was not in accordance with the provisions of 
the Code,
5. The Code also provides for parties to a dispute to re­
solve such a dispute through mutually agreed procedures 
other than the Codes^international mandatory concilia­
tion procedure. The use of such alternative means of 
solving disputes is not permitted in the case of dis­
putes relating to freight rate increases,surcharges and 
currency adjustment factors if national legislation rules 
or regulations prevent shippers from having this free­
dom of choice.
The major weakness of the conciliation system set 
out in the Code is the ability of either party to reject 
its results if they wish to do so, and the absence of any 
effective sanction against the party which does so reject 
the recommendation. This new concept has never been function­
ing.And, it is believed that it will never be allowed to 
come into effect, because the EEC regulationexcludes use of 
the procedures of IflC in trades between members states and 
bther OECD countries. Limited' the. use of the system 
results in ineffectiveness. Additionally, most of the limited 
trade is with developed countries, members of the OECD,
Will conference members which have rejected the system in 
one part of their operations be willing to accept it in
other trades?
Government in the application of the Code
In chapter I of the Code, a definition of an "appro­
priate authority" is given. The Code definition of an appro­
priate authority is : "Either a government or a body desig­
nated by a government or by a national legislation to per­
form any of the functions ascribed to such authority by the 
provisions of this Code." Or to put it more simply, an appro­
priate authority is a body designated to do those things 
under the Code which the Code says it can or should do. Thus 
the definition says nothing about the status of such a body, 
nor of its precise relation to the government which desig­
nated it.
What can Appropriate authorities do? The preamble to 
the Code contains three basis principles, of which one is 
the principle that conferences should hold "meaningful" con­
sultations, in which appropriate authorities could partici­
pate upon request.
Certain attributes of appropriate authoritise are found 
in the definitions contained in chapter I. According to these 
definitions, an appropriate authority could:
- recognise a national shipping line ; and
- recoghisBjif it so desires, a shippersSrganization.
Turning to the body of the Code we find the following
provisions concerning the role of appropriate authorities, 
namely:
- appropriate authorities can request that their views 
on the admission of a new member to a conference be taken
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into accountj(Article l(5))
- approoriate authorities of the countries at both 
ends of the trade may, if they so wish, take up the matters 
of a disagreement between their groups of national ship­
ping lines on the question of pooling and make their views 
knoun;( Article 2(l4)), however, that one appropriate autho­
rity cannot act on its own in such a matter;
- conferences shall provide machinery for reporting, 
on request, to appropriate authorities on action taken in 
connection with malpractices, etc ;( Articl e 5(l)>(c))
“ conferences shall make available to approoriate autho­
rities, on request, copies of the conference agreements and 
other related documents Article B)
- appropiate authorities "Shall have the right, upon 
request, to participate fully in consultations, but this does 
not mean they play a decision-making role."(Article 11 (l)); 
and
*” appropriate authorities have the right to request 
information and notice of intended action by conferences; 
(Article 10; 14(l); 15(4); 19(2))
Article 14 seems to provide,by non-exclusion, that 
appropriate authorities may request consultations in con­
nection with a general freight rate increase and may request 
the submission of a report from indeoendent accountants.
In the Article 14(2) say "at the request of any of the 
parties prescribed for this -purpose in this Code...consul­
tations shall commence..." The interpretation that appropri-
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ate authorities, not being specificlly excluded, are included 
among the bodies entitled to demand consultation is debat­
able.
In Article IB concerning surcharges and Article 17 
concerning currency changes, it is ’’parties directly affected” 
ujho are to be notified of any intened action and uho can 
participate in consultations, which seems by implication 
not to include aporopriate authorities. However, since 
these are matters which may, according to Article 11, be the 
subject of consultations, it seems that appropriate authori­
ties must be notified, if they so wish, and may, also if 
they so wish, participate in the consultations.
The Code and technology changes
When the Code was drafted in 1973-197A liner confer­
ences were in a more dominant position than they are today. 
Liner Conferences were viewed by developing countries at 
that time of powerful cartels which were capable of dicta­
ting the terms of cargo carriage.At the same time they were 
able to restrain the possible growth of local national fleets 
thruogh control over conference m,errbership, the use of loyal­
ty agreements with shippers, and through their existing . 
strength experience, and trade netiaork.*
Much has changed since 1973-1974. Strong, well-financed 
non-conference,lines have emerged and taken a substantial 
amount of cargo away from conference lines. In1974, times 
were such that in most 1iner-traffics th©.conferences covered 
roughly 90 percent of the trade,whilst today outsider par­
ticipation of between 2 0 % to 50^ in quite a number of trades
is often the case
With in these ID years, the oil price has exploded 
and world economy has to face one of the worst recessions 
ever experienced. World recession has reduced wotld trade 
and the demand for shipping services so that liner shipping, 
though to a lesser extent than is the case with bulk shipping, 
is marked by significant over-capacity of tonnage. This 
situation of excess supply of tonnage together with a fun­
damental structural change in liner shipping,the so-called 
container revolution,had weakened conference position.
Containerization has changed the face of liner ship­
ping, introducing new, highly-productive.ships in the decline 
in growth of world trade worsened thesituation ,oif .the exces­
sive supply.
Liner shipping is now increasinglysseen by many as 
a part of the world-wide,integrated, intermodal system of 
transportation moving goods from door to door rather than 
as a discrete activity moving goods from port to port.
Containerized shipping operations, however,are capi­
tal intensive. In these circumstances,many liner operators 
are constantly seeking to rationalize their services via 
cosortia, coordinated sailings, space charter agreements,
•joint services ect» This arises some problems regarding 
the Codes application.The Code never mentioned of 'con­
sortium' It is a new type of combination which is considered 
as a single carrier and, in the Code terms is not a group 
of vessel-operating carriers. Itcan be a member of the
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conference as it can trade as an independent line which 
represents a real threat to conferences
And due to its high fixed costs, financial success 
of containerized shipping operations depends upon high load 
factors and quick turn around time. One of the consequences 
of containerized shipping is the emergence of the concept 
of load center ports. From the stand point of economy of 
Qoeration, large container vessels should operate only bet­
ween such load centers rather than calling at several ports 
at each end of a trade.
Another aspect of containerized shipping which may 
impact Code imolementation is reflected in the growing com­
petition among ports for cargoes. While ports have always 
competed to some extent, by virtue of geographic propinquity 
and limited alternative transportation possibilities from 
inland areas ports could rely on cargo being provided from 
their national'hinterlands^ With containerization all ibis 
is changing; hinterlands of different ports increasingly 
are overlapping, due to the shippers ability to move his 
goods via a variety of ports, evenon different coasts. 
Land-bridge and mini-bridge service is a reality today.
Non-conference shipping lines and fair competition on 
a commercial basis:
In the Code text, there are no provision dealing with 
•̂ ■non conference line^except for Article 18 dealing with fight­
ing ships, the use of which is prohibited. UNCTAD regarded 
fighting ships as an anticompetitive device which almost
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invariably led to the disruption of the trade. In addition 
to the Code article there is a resolution on non-conference 
shipping lines annexed to the Code, This picks up some of 
the provisions which had been proposed for inclusion in the 
Code and is protective of the position of non-conference 
lines. The Code always uses the term 'non-conference I'ineC 
It never utilize the word 'outsider^ There is a difference 
between a non-conference line and an outsider. The term 
'outsider'embraces all types of competitors to the confer̂ -
n
ence such as tramps, specialized carriers and include non­
conference line, where as the term 'non-conference line' 
covers only the offer of regular service on a similar basis 
to those offered by the conference, 'Outsider'is also used 
to refer to a line, member of a conference, whose ships are 
rarely fully loaded on one or other leg of their normal vo­
yages, calling at ports which are served by another confer­
ence with the purpose of taking cargo. The outsider offer a 
regular service, but without any guarantee of continuity.
The resolution on non-conference shipping lines offers them 
protection only if they observe the principles of fair compe­
tition, The principles are easy to mention in broad terms, 
but difficult to define, ivir, Sturmey has shown his opinion 
that it is easier to give examples of what is not fair compe­
tition than of what is fair competition, and that a line mem­
ber of a conference are operating under a number of constraints, 
as: - the need to make a sufficient profit in the long run
to motivate the owners to maintain and replace their ships
in order to assure the continuity of the service;
- the need to maintain an administrative structure at 
the conference level.
- a common carrier obligation to take what cargo is 
offered and not to reject low-rated cargo, for example;
- the duty to provide a regular service in good times 
and in bad; and
- the need to conform to Code rules on a wide variety 
of issues, including giving notice of the intention to in- 
crease rates or imoose surcharges, to hold consultations, 
to furnish information and reports etc.
And his further opinion of what., are the cases of unfair . 
competition as follows:
- Ships which had carried cargoes of cement to lagos
a few years back had earned enormous demurrage while lying 
at anchor for ten months or so; many then tried to lift 
cargoes from Abidjan at cut rates. Such ships were obviously 
not thinking of long term sevice and so were offering un­
fair competition.
- A ship which calls at ports only for high rated car­
goes and ignores-all the rest is not assuming common carrier 
obligations.
- A well established liner company, members of a con­
ference , which poaches on the territory of another confer­
ence lis not thinking of providing a regular service to the 
trade,nor thinking of long term costs, ect.
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PART THREE
DEUELOPIVIEMT of national fleets with
THE CODE
CHAPTER Mil
THE CURREWT SITUATION OF SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN THAILAND
International trade plays a very important part in 
Thai econemy. Exports and imports both in terms of volume 
and value are increasing. The main imports are chemicalŝ . , 
machinery,iron ore, vehicles etc. The main exports are 
agricultural products,rubber & synthetic,electric machinery. 
The volume of trade both inward and outward by sea has in­
creased from 20 mt, in 197A to 32 mt.in 1981 which repre­
sented 60 % increase.
Inspite of the importance of international seaborne 
trade of Thailand,the size of national fleets is very 
small. In 197A,only 3,59 % of the total volume of trade was 
carried by national fleets. The participation of national 
fleets in carrying national cargo has slowly increasedto 
7,12^ in 1981,8 years since then.
In 1978 Government issued the ('Mercantile ('Marine Pro­
motion Commission Act 1978 with the purpose to support na­
tional shipping activities such as seatransportation,marine 
insurance,shipbuilding and repairing and ports. To carry 
out th'ese tas(<s,the Commission and its secretariat' office 
have been formed. Since then Government has already carried 
out several policy measures trying to expand national mer­
chant fleets. In addition to man power development,..giving 
ineentive to foreign investment and encouraging Thai shipping
10B.
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companies to open new routes i.e. Thailand-America and Aus­
tralia, u/e have laid down a plan to give supports to national 
ships by following measurements; (some measures have not 
been putinto effect).
Cargo Reservation
1, not less than ^ 0 % of Governments export cargoes will be 
asked to be transported by Thai ships during sales nego­
tiation and this will also be applied to individuals^ 
exports when selling in CIF terms but must not obstrojct the 
trade.
2, All import cargo that belong tbaGovernment, state enter- 
prisesand government loan cargoes shall be transported by 
Thai ships.
Tax incentive
Give tax privilege to Thai shipping companies'sharehold­
ers and those who use Thai ships.
I^onetary measures
1, Founding merchant marine funds
2. Giving financial assistance in the form of packing credit.
In 1980 the number of Thai registered ships was 108, 
total capacity was 557,8^1 dwt. That number has increased 
to 149 ships with capacity 678,577 DWT. in 1983. The DWT. 
increased 22^, When compacing with Thai neighbouring coun­
tries, it is found that , in 1;980 the Philippines has general 
cargo ships totally 1,192 n.DWT, Indonesia and Flalaysia have 
merchant fleets 1.086 M.and 1,0 n.DWT. respectively.
Table 1 No.DWT. classified by ship's type in 1980
and 1983
Total Dry Cargo Tanker
Year No . DWT No. DliiT No, DWT.
1 980 106 557,6A1 56 328,4A2 50 229,199
1983 1 A9 678,577 87 435,341 62 243,236
Source: Office of I'lercantile Marine Promotion Commission
«C
Most of Thai ships are small and old. Most of them 
are conventional type. In 1980 the average capacity of Thai 
ships is 5,261 DU/T,the average capacity of dry cargo ships 
is 5,865 OUT, In 1982,it was found that in 83 examples the 
percentage of ships that were in bad condition was 62.7 
(more than 16 years old. )of these moderate was 32,5 (between 
6 - 1 5  years old) and those in good condition was 4.8(less 
than 6 years). Having most of the ship being in bad condi­
tion results in
1. the high cost of maintenance
2. having low speed,staying relatively longstime in dry 
dock result in low earning time of the ships.
3. more difficult to get cargoes. Shippers have to pay 
more insurance premium for their cargoes.
Most of Thai ships are conventional type . There are 
only 5 small LNG carriers. Almost all tankers are product 
carriers, Thailand at the present time do not have a
container vessel but a feu container feeders,
Paticipation of Thai ships in carrying national cargo 
In 1974 Thai seaborne trade volume carried by Thai 
vessels is only 3.61^. The percentage has increased gradually 
to 5.26^ in 1978 and 7,12 in 1981,
Problems and ocstacles
National fleets cannot develop and take very little 
part in the transportation of Thai foreign trade due to 
many factors: *1.
1, Lack of competitive condition: Shipping today is a ca­
pital intensive industry as already mentioned. Competi­
tive shipping companies have used very high advance 
tecnology in many sections of operations and management, 
ship operation, maintenance,fuel saving, information 
netuorks. Comparing to Thai ships most of uhich are 
small and old. And most of them are conventional type. 
Conventional vessels are considered to-be inefficient ships 
Their speeds are relatively slou, A container ship 
is about tuo times faster than conventional ships,- And 
at the same size a containership has 6 times more capa­
city than a conventional ship. The next problem is Thai 
shipping companies are too many but small , many ships.- 
ping companies have only one ship to operate. This re­
sults in high operating cost per ship. And lack of mar­
keting and management skills.
The enforcement of international convention on safety 
and pollution prevention limited the trading area of
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Thai ships.
2. Lack of funds: shipping today is high investment. To buy 
or build new ships is expensive. And the returns are rela­
tively small. Governments in many countries are providing 
their national shipowners with long term loans and low 
interest rates. In Thailand there is only one state-owned 
financial company that offers loans for shipping with the 
interest of 14.5?q, No private-owned commercial companies 
are interested in this industry. Onemain reason is l^ck of 
skilled people in this business.
3. Lack of skilled manpower in the field of shipping: 
Statistics in 1977 shows that 2,037 people are employed 
in 67 ships (both dry cargo carriers and tankers). Ofthe 
2,037 people 859 people are foreigners or reoresented A3^. 
Those needed are high level managers and operators. Most 
of Thai master mariners came from the Navy.
CHAPTER VIII
LINER SHIPPING IN THAILAND AND STATUS OF PARTICIPATION OF 
THAI NATIONAL FLAG VESSELS IN CONFERENCES
Dry cargo prospects 
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There are 5 outuiard conferences carrying outward ,
cargoes from Thailand
1. Thailand/Bay of Bengal Rate Agreement
2. Thailand/Europe Conference
3. Thailand/Japan Conference
li, Thailand/Pacific Freight Conference
5, Thailand/US Atlantic and Gulf Conference
There are as many as 20 inwards conferences carrying
inward' cargoes to Thailand either calling Thai port (Bang- /
kok port) as direct port or base port. But most of those 
conference,, vessels do not call Bangkok port directlŷ . They 
call at Singapore and have their cargoes transhiped in 
feeders to Bangkok port. Singapore serves as a centre port 
for FAREAST and another reason is Bangkok port is a river 
port. It is too small to recieve ocean containers.
The important inwards conferences are
1, Japan/Thailand Freight Conference
2, Far Eastern Freight Conference (East bound)
The participation of Thai ships in the Conferences*. 
Four Thai shipping companies are members of both Thai­
land/Japan Conference and Japan/Thailand Freight Conference 
A Thai shipping company is a member of both Thailand/
Europe Conference and FEFC
We don't have any Thai shipping lines sailing to and 
from the USA,Australia which are considered as Thai's big 
trading partners
(l) Japan - Thailand Conference (import) 
cargoes carried by flag vessels
112.
Unit Revenue Ton
Volume of cargo 
Year Japan flag Thai flag
1979 829,524 (51.l) 475,254 (29.l)
1980 769,965 (48.7) 499,087 (31.6)
1981 739,739 (47.l) 500,687 (31.8)
Third country Total
321,525 (19.8) 1,626,123 
310,549 (19.7) 1,579.601 
331,583 (21.1 ) 1,572,009
(2 ) Thailand - Japan Conference (export)
Unit Revenue Ton
Volume of cargo
Year Japan flag Thai flag Third country Total
1979 292,745 (27.0) 460,014 (42.4) 332,882 (30.6) 1,085,641
1980 76,093 (1 2.2 ) 285,674 (45.9) 260,320 (41 .9) 622,087
1981 11 3,662 (1 6.5) 294,556 (42,7) 280,954 (40.8) 689,172
1982 21 8,969 (31.7) 253,787 (36.7) 217,862 (31 .5) 690,618




sailing volume sailing volume
TOTAL
sailing volume
1979 220 702,552 54 319,655 284 1 ,022,207
1980 198 406,470 30 149,542 228 555,012
1981 180 229,896 30 141,829 210 371,725
1982 216 620,889 73 387,592 289 1,008,481
From those tables showing cargoes carried in Thailand- 
Japan route, we can see that Thai vessels carried inward 
cargoes amounting to around 30̂ . of cargo carried by confe­
rences and outward cargoes amounting to around Table
no,3 shows that outside lines carried a substantial part 
of Thailand - Japan trade.
Those statistics are a bit old. But it is said that 
at the time being Thai vessels carry. J more or less of
the cargoes carried by conferences and outsiders carry 40 % 
of the total trade. This situation is somewhat similar to 
the Thoiland-Europe trade. These statistics donot show the 
revenue earned by Thai ships. However, due to the fact that 
Th$x ships are of conventional type, it is believed that 
they carry . relatively low valued cargoes which generated 
low freight rates.
CHAPTER IX
SUGGESTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CODE IN THAILAND
The Code should be implemented in the way that it be 
taken as a philosophy that aimed to promote national ship­
ping industry and national overseas trade. It should not 
be looked at as a set of rigid rules that bind all the 
parties concerned resulting in the restriction of the free 
flow of trade.
The following are the roles that should be maintained 
by the Government:
- -to facilitate the conditions that bring stability and 
efficiency to the sea transportation services,
- to maintain the balance in the power between the sea- 
transport suppliers and seatransport users,
- to support and assist in building up of a modern national 
shipping industry and other related infrastructure,
- to keep trace of the developments of new technology 
and new concepts which will bring changes to the shipping 
industry and to be able to take immediate actions whenever 
it was found that the changes will bring detriment to the 
national interests and securities.
In the present situation of wold shipping, there 
is excessive supply of shipping services. This causes an 
unfettered competition among shipowners. This situation
may result in the low utilization of vessels in many trades,
(
In liner sector this will cause high cost per ton in the
ships operation and cause higher freight rates than other­
wise when the whole space of the ship is utilized. One 
solution can be that the Government find a proper way to 
limit, in each particular trade, the number of carriers that 
can meet the demand for seatransport and can provide services 
according to the requirement of the trade. The Code attributes 
to the concept of having a limited number of carriers as 
it is in favour of "closed conference". Under a certain ■' 
number of carriers, carriers can cooperate better than where 
the number is uncertain, «
The Governments policy should encourage those non­
conference carriers to enter conferences,.In this way, they 
can coordinate and rationalize their services.
The Governments policy should strengthen the conference 
system by eliminating the circumstance by which non-conference 
lines gain benbfit over conference member lines. That is 
to impose common carrier obligation to both of them equally 
and put an end to the chances of non—conference lines to 
pick up only high value goods with lower rates than those 
of the conferences.
The Code gives a definition to "conference” but never 
defines those new forms of combinations such as consortium, 
joint service etc. These new organisations can be big and 
powerful and be able to go alongside independently with 
conferences. The Government should force them to enter into 
the framework of conference. If consortia are free to operate 
outside, it is not justified for conferences^members who are
being under certain number of obligations given by the Code, 
The Government should encourage Conferences to use 
loyalty arrangements as fighting tools against different 
kinds of outsiders.
The Government should encourage the use of pooling 
agreement fo.r making the best use of full rationalization. 
The Government might support conferences by facili­
tating the operation of the conferences^vessels or giving
A.them some privileges for example.
US
Policy to promote national fleets
In the present situation of overtonnaging, the Go­
vernment should encourage Thai shipowners to replace the 
old conventional type vessels with fairly new container 
vessels the type,size and speed of which should be opti­
mum to the particular trade.
The Government should encourage the mergeiCcof 
small shipping companies into -larger concerns°‘̂ which 
Government might put the requirement that the new coinpanies 
be public companies before accepting as National Shipping 
lines.
The Government should encourage the opening of new 
routes for national ships in the trade the volume of which 
is substantial enough to run a regular service. In the trade 
the volume of which is small,the solution might be the use 
of space chartering.
The Government should support ’ joint venturesbet- 
•ween National Shipping Companie^and advanced foreign companies
for the gains of technical know how, management and opera­
tional skills.
The Government should induce direct calls by ocean 
carriers to Thai ports. If it is not commercially viable 
to do so, Government should initiate negotiations for Thai 
shipowners to get a fair share in the carriage of national 
seaborne trade in the regional level.
The Government should take initial steps to form an 
organization of shippers which represents the interests of 
every group of shippers, ff Freight consolidation center 
or freight booking center should be established in the 
organization.
The Government should induce Thai exporters to sell 
in GIF term and importers to buy in FOB term and encourage 
them to use the services of national shipping lines or any 
lines which are members of conferences.
The Government should establish a freight study unit
and shipping data base for the use of development planning 
and to strengthen the negotiation power of national shippers
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